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Executive Summary
This appeal involves four issues relating to the scope of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly known as
the Clean Water Act (CWA)). CWA §§ 101-606, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The first issue ad-
dresses whether groundwater is "navigable water" under the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) and, therefore, subject to National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit-
ting, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The second issue addresses whether a
challenge to a permit condition brought during an enforce-
ment action is time-barred. The third issue addresses
whether state or federal law should be applied when review-
ing a state water quality standard requirement contained in
federal permits. Finally, the fourth issue addresses whether
a general condition in a permit, for compliance with state
water quality standard uses, is enforceable without con-
verting the general condition into specific limitations and re-
quirements. This memorandum provides background
information for each issue as well as arguments on both sides
of the issues.
The CWA was enacted in response to the severe degrada-
tion of many of the Nation's waters. The purpose of the CWA
is to restore and maintain these waters. The CWA estab-
lished a permitting system to control discharges into water.
The CWA prohibits the discharge of a pollutant into naviga-
ble waters without an NPDES permit. Before a permit is is-
sued, the CWA requires that the applicant receive
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/4
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certification from the state in which the affected waterbody is
located. The permit must comply with specific state and fed-
eral requirements. The CWA also requires states to develop
water quality standards consisting of a use for a waterbody
and criteria based on that use. Effluent limitations based on
these water quality standards are required to be incorporated
into permits by the basic provisions of the CWA and may also
be incorporated into a permit as a condition of state
certification.
The focus of the instant case is on two discharges by XXX
Corp. Friends of the Roaritan (FOR), a not-for-profit corpora-
tion dedicated to protecting the Roaritan River in the State of
New Union, brought a citizen suit against XXX for alleged
violations of the CWA. A wastepile located on XXX's property
is leaching lead into the groundwater which eventually en-
ters the Roaritan River after one mile. XXX appeals the opin-
ion of the United States District Court for the District of New
Union which held that the groundwater was "navigable
water" under the CWA. Based on this determination, the
court concluded that the seepage of lead into the groundwater
violated the CWA.
The second discharge is from XXX's discharge pipe, for
which it has a permit. The discharge contains selenium,
which causes, or contributes to causing, the concentration of
selenium in the Roaritan to exceed safe drinking levels estab-
lished under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Public
Health Service Act (Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)), 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f - 300j-26 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The permit
does not contain an effluent limitation for selenium, but it
generally prohibits discharges which violate a water quality
standard. New Union has designated the use of the Roaritan
to be for human consumption without treatment, although it
does not have a criterion for selenium based on that use.
FOR appeals a determination by the District Court that
XXX's challenge to the permit condition prohibiting "viola-
tions of water quality standards" is ripe for review now, de-
spite the passage of a statutory time limitation for judicial
review in the CWA. FOR claims that XXX lost its opportunity
to challenge the condition because it failed to challenge the
1999] 363
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permit when issued. XXX and New Union also appeal the
District Court's holding that federal law should be applied to
state water quality standards and that, based on federal law,
water quality standards without criteria are enforceable.
XXX and New Union argue that the court erred in applying
federal law rather than state law and the law of New Union
clearly states that water quality standards without criteria
are not enforceable. Therefore, XXX and New Union argue
the discharges of selenium do not violate the CWA.
XXX claims that groundwater is not "navigable water"
under the CWA. In order to support this claim, XXX relies on
decisions which have specifically held that groundwater is
not "navigable water." XXX also relies on the legislative his-
tory and the language of the CWA to argue that groundwater
is not "navigable water." If groundwater is not "navigable
water" under the CWA, then the seepage of lead from the
wastepile into the groundwater is not a discharge prohibited
by the CWA because the CWA only prohibits discharges into
"navigable water."
FOR maintains that groundwater is tributary to "naviga-
ble water," and is itself "navigable water," because EPA's reg-
ulatory definition of "navigable water" includes tributaries
thereto. Therefore, the seepage of lead from the wastepile
constitutes the discharge of a pollutant into "navigable
water" without a permit. Like XXX, FOR relies on the legis-
lative history and language of the CWA to support its argu-
ment. FOR also points to decisions which have held that
certain groundwater can be "navigable water." FOR notes
that "tributary groundwater" has been held to be "navigable
water." XXX counters that the "tributary groundwater" deci-
sion, relied upon by FOR, is irrelevant because it addressed
"tributary groundwater" that was immediately adjacent to
navigable-in-fact surface waters as opposed to being sepa-
rated by a mile as in the instant case.
XXX argues that the challenge to the permit condition
was not ripe when the permit was issued. Consequently, the
issue was not ripe during the statutory time period. The
challenge requires a more concrete factual context on which
the court can base its decision. It is necessary to see how the
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permit condition will be applied and how it will affect XXX.
Therefore, XXX argues the statutory time period should not
have begun to run when the permit was issued.
FOR claims that if the challenge to the permit condition
was not brought during the statutory time period, the oppor-
tunity to bring it was lost. According to the CWA, any chal-
lenge which could have been brought during the statutory
time-period, and was not brought, cannot be raised in an en-
forcement proceeding. In addition, FOR argues that the issue
of whether or not a water quality standard must be reduced
to numerical or other specific requirements in a permit is a
purely legal issue, requiring no factual context. The issue
was therefore ripe during the statutory time period. Even if
XXX did not believe the issue was ripe for review during the
statutory time period, XXX was required to bring the chal-
lenge during the statutory time period and await determina-
tion by the court as to whether the issue was ripe for review.
XXX and New Union argue that the issue of whether a
permit requirement to comply with water quality standards,
without additional criteria, is enforceable is a question of
state law. As such, the holding of the Supreme Court of New
Union, that water quality standards are not enforceable with-
out criteria, is controlling. See Prentice v. Dep't of Envtl.
Quality, 435 N.U. 875 (1989) (hypothetical case for the Moot
Court Competition). XXX and New Union claim that the is-
sue is a question of state law because it interprets state regu-
lations based on a state statute. The provision was
incorporated into the permit as a condition of state certifica-
tion. Therefore, the EPA and the citizens are bound by the
state court's interpretation.
FOR, on the other hand, claims that the issue is a ques-
tion of federal law. The state regulations must be approved
by the EPA federalized. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91
(1992). In the instant case, the permit provision is boiler-
plate in EPA permits. The EPA had to include the provision
in the permit as a matter of federal law regardless of the cer-
tification condition. However, even if the court determines
that the provision was incorporated as a condition of state
certification rather than EPA initiative, state water quality
1999] 365
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regulations are adopted in response to the CWA, and are in-
corporated into federal permits and enforceable through the
CWA. Therefore, the court is not bound by the state court's
interpretation.
XXX and New Union also maintain that the legislative
history demonstrates that Congress intended CWA permits to
provide certainty to permittees. Indeed, Congress stated that
it was "attempting to . . . provide law that can be adminis-
tered with certainty and precision." 117 Cong. Rec. 17,404
(1971). An unqualified permit condition that XXX comply
with water quality standards is inconsistent with this con-
gressional intent. In order to achieve specificity and cer-
tainty, a five-step process is followed: 1) the state designates
a use; 2) criteria are established based on that use; 3) a To-
tal Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) is determined for the par-
ticular waterbody at issue; 4) the allowable waste load for the
pollutant is allocated among the polluting sources; and 5)
specific effluent limitations are included in permits based on
the waste load allocations. See Jeffrey Gaba, Federal Super-
vision of State Water Quality Standards Under the Clean
Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (1983). XXX and New
Union argue that only the first step was completed. Without
a criterion and a TMDL for selenium, a waste load allocation
cannot be made between XXX and Sigma Chemical, the other
(larger) discharger of selenium one mile upstream. If a waste
load allocation is not reduced to an effluent limitation in a
permit, XXX does not know how much selenium must be re-
duced in its discharge. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce
water quality standards to numeric or specific effluent limita-
tions in the permit. A permit condition to "comply with water
quality standards" is nothing more than a condition to "com-
ply with the CWA." Such a condition simply does not tell a
permittee what is expected of them. If such a condition would
not provide a meaningful requirement, it would not be neces-
sary to issue permits.
FOR claims that it is not necessary to follow the five-step
process to implement water quality standards. Although the
five-step process may be preferable, including in the permit a
condition prohibiting violations of the state water quality
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standards is also a valid method. Narrative standards are
routinely enforced without allocation or reduction to specific
numbers. FOR relies on precedent to support its claim that
water quality use designations are enforceable without apply-
ing the five-step process reducing criteria to effluent limita-
tions. See Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology
[hereinafter Jefferson County II], 511 U.S. 700 (1994), affg
849 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1993); Northwest Envtl. Advocates v.
City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995). Moreover, if the
court does require criteria for selenium, the use essentially
has one in the Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) for sele-
nium established under the SDWA.
Suggested Questions for the Judges
Sample Questions on the Groundwater Issue
Questions for FOR and New Union:
1. How can groundwater be "navigable water" when the leg-
islative history specifically states that Congress refused to in-
clude federal standards for groundwater? See S. Rep. 92-414
at 73 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3739.
2. If groundwater is intended to be regulated by an NPDES
permitting, CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. §1342 (1994), why is
groundwater specifically mentioned in the information and
funding sections of the CWA but noticeably absent in the per-
mitting and enforcement sections?
3. Doesn't navigability imply the use of a waterway for trans-
portation? And isn't groundwater essentially not suitable for
transportation?
4. Groundwater is used in the same sentence as "navigable
water" in several sections of the CWA . See CWA §§ 102(a),
104(a)(5), 106(e)(1), 202(b)(2), 208(b)(2)(K), 304(f), 502(6), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), 1254(a)(5), 1256(e)(1), 1282(b),
1288(b)(2)(K), 1314(f), 1362(6) (1994). If groundwater is
"navigable water," wouldn't this be surplusage?
5. Isn't groundwater adequately protected under other acts
such as the SDWA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1994 & Supp.
II 1996), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994), and the Comprehensive Envi-
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ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
§§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 - 9675 (1994)? If the CWA cov-
ered groundwater, wouldn't those acts be redundant?
Questions for XXX:
1. Congress and the EPA have recognized tributary water as
"navigable water." Therefore, shouldn't tributary ground-
water be recognized as "navigable water?"
2. Considering Congress and the courts keep expanding the
scope of "navigable water" beyond its traditional meaning,
shouldn't "navigable water" include groundwater?
3. Shouldn't the CWA be read to the fullest extent of the
Commerce Clause, Const. Art. I, § cl. 3, which would include
groundwater?
4. Doesn't the authority to control injection into wells neces-
sarily require control over groundwater since wells empty
into groundwater? Since CWA Section 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(1) (1994), requires the Administrator to have the
same authority as states under CWA Section 402(b), 33
U.S.C. 1342(b), Section 402(b) requires states to have the au-
thority to issue permits which control the disposal of pollu-
tants into wells, doesn't it follow that the Administrator must
also have the authority to issue permits which control dispo-
sal of pollutants into wells?
5. The Administrator has authority to issue permits from
point sources. Doesn't the fact that the definition of "point
source" includes "wells" indicate that the administrator has
control over groundwater?
6. Permits are required for discharges of pollutants into
"navigable water." The definition of "pollutant" excludes in-
jection into wells related to the production of oil and gas.
Wouldn't this exception indicate that all other injections into
wells are pollutants controlled by the NPDES program?
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Sample Questions on the Ripeness Issue
Questions for XXX:
1. Shouldn't XXX have challenged the permit condition dur-
ing the statutory time period and allowed the court to deter-
mine whether the issue was ripe?
2. Doesn't CWA Section 509, 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (1994), specifi-
cally state that judicial review must be obtained within 120
days of issuance of the permit and the only exception is when
additional information develops?
3. Isn't XXX asking the court to perform a retrospective ripe-
ness analysis, which the courts are reluctant to do?
4. Setting aside the fact that the issue is time-barred,
wouldn't a court performing a ripeness analysis at the time
the permit was issued refuse to defer review because to do so
would cause hardship on one of the parties? In the absence
of review at that time, wouldn't XXX have to comply with the
water quality standards and be subject to civil and criminal
penalties?
Questions for FOR and New Union:
1. How does the court benefit from a more concrete factual
basis at the time of enforcement than it had at the time the
permit was issued?
2. A court can only hear an issue that is ripe. If a challenge
to the issuance of a permit can only be brought during the
statutory time period, and the issue was not ripe during that
time period, isn't the petitioner prevented from having his
day in court? If the issue is unripe during the statutory time
period, doesn't the statutory time period have to begin to run
when the issue becomes ripe if the issue remains unripe dur-
ing the statutory time period?
3. The permit prohibits the violation of water quality stan-
dards. The state may change these water quality standards
from time to time. Isn't it impossible, therefore, to know
which water quality standards the discharger may be subject
to at the time of permit issuance? If so, how can review be
ripe at that time?
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4. Courts have held that similar statutory time limitations in
other acts, such as the CAA, §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671q (1994), have not began to run until the issue was ripe.
Shouldn't the same apply to the CWA statutory time
limitation?
Sample Questions on the State or Federal Law Issue
Questions for FOR:
1. Aren't state water quality standards creations of state law
and, therefore, should be interpreted by the state courts?
2. Isn't the provision in the permit as a condition of state
certification of state law requirements which the Administra-
tor is required to include in the permit under CWA Section
401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)?
3. Hasn't the EPA determined that limitations and condi-
tions attributable to state certification shall be made through
applicable procedures of the state?
Questions for XXX and New Union:
1. Aren't water quality standards federal because they re-
quire approval from the Administrator and are only enforcea-
ble through an NPDES permits issued under federal law?
2. Isn't the provision included in the permit because: 1) the
language is boilerplate language which the EPA incorporates
into all its permits as a matter of federal law; and 2) CWA
Section 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1994) requires
the Administrator to achieve effluent limitations which meet
water quality standards as a matter of federal law? There-
fore, isn't it federal law and not a requirement of state
certification?
3. Hasn't the Supreme Court referred to the state water
quality standards as federalized? Arkansas v. Oklahoma,
503 U.S. 91 (1992).
4. Even if the court finds the state interpretation of the stan-
dards should apply rather than the federal interpretation,
CWA section 510, 33 U.S.C. 1370 (1994), only preserves state
law which is more stringent than federal law. In the instant
case, doesn't the federal interpretation govern because the
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state interpretation is less stringent than the federal
interpretation?
Sample Questions on the Enforceability of Water
Quality Standards Without Criteria
Questions for FOR:
1. Aren't two of the purposes behind the 1972 amendments to
the CWA to provide certainty and economic efficiency? If
water quality standards are enforceable without being re-
duced to specific requirements in permits, won't the permit-
tee remain uncertain as to what steps it must take, what
pollutants it must control, and how much money it is ex-
pected to spend in order to reduce pollution?
2. Aren't there five steps which must be taken before a water
quality standard can be meaningfully applied to individual
discharges? (1. designate use; 2. develop criteria based on
the use; 3. determine the Total Maximum Daily Load
(TMDL) for each pollutant in order to achieve the criteria; 4.
allocate the pollution reduction among the sources of the pol-
lutant; and 5. translate the waste load allocation into efflu-
ent limitations in permits) And isn't the first step the only
one which has been completed in this case?
3. Sigma Chemical is discharging twice as much selenium as
XXX. Yet, because XXX is one mile downstream of Sigma
Chemical, XXX is charged with violating the water quality
standard. Is it fair that XXX carries the entire burden for
violating the water quality standard? Aren't the very pur-
poses of the TMDL and waste load allocation processes to
fairly allocate water quality standards required treatment in
such circumstances?
Questions for XXX and New Union:
1. Why have some courts found that water quality standards
without criteria are enforceable?
2. Narrative criteria have often been enforceable and they
contain no numeric limitation. Why should the water quality
standard in the instant case be treated any differently?
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3. Don't we have criteria for selenium in the form of the MCL
established by the EPA pursuant to the SDWA?
4. CWA section 501(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994), defines efflu-
ent limitations, and it includes standards and limitations
from CWA Sections 301, 302, 306, 307, 401, 402, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1341, 1342 (1994). It does not in-
clude CWA Section 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994), which ad-
dresses state water quality standards. Isn't it true that
water quality standards are only enforceable when they are
reduced to effluent limitations in permits?
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER GROUNDWATER IS "NAVIGABLE
WATER" FOR PURPOSES OF THE CLEAN
WATER ACT.
The purpose of the CWA is to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters." CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). The legis-
lation was passed partially in response to findings that
"many of the Nation's navigable waters are severely polluted,
and major waterways near the industrial and urban areas
are unfit for most purposes." S. Rep. 92-414 at 7 (1972), re-
printed in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674.
Congress was not explicit, however, whether the CWA
was intended to protect groundwater as well as surface
water.
Groundwater is part of the hydrologic cycle. Precipita-
tion returns to the earth's surface and collects in streams,
lakes, rivers, and other bodies of water. See G. Tyler Miller,
Living in the Environment 101 (Wadsworth Publishing, 8th
ed. 1994). However, the precipitation also permeates the soil
and seeps downward. See id. The groundwater flows down-
hill, as do surface rivers and streams, and eventually empties
into streams, lakes, or springs. The layer of rock or soil con-
taining the groundwater is referred to as an aquifer. See id.
The CWA prohibits the "discharge of any pollutant by
any person" unless the discharge is in compliance with the
CWA. CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994). Determining the
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precise implications of the prohibition requires an examina-
tion of several definitions. An analysis of these definitions is
necessary to determine whether the prohibition includes dis-
charges into groundwater.
The CWA defines the "discharge of a pollutant" as "any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source." CWA § 502c(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994 & Supp.
II). "Pollutant," "navigable water," and "point source" are
further defined by the CWA but "addition" is not. Id. The
definition of "pollutant" provides a list of materials but specif-
ically excludes material that is injected into a well, and then
to groundwater, for the purpose of facilitating oil or gas pro-
duction. CWA § 502(6)(B), 33 U.S.C. 1362(6)(B) (1994 & Supp.
II 1996). "Navigable waters" is defined as "the waters of the
United States." CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994 &
Supp. II). Courts have disagreed as to whether or not "navi-
gable waters" includes groundwater.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), charged
with administering the CWA, interpreted the phrase "waters
of the United States" to include "all waters which are cur-
rently used, were used in the past, or may be susceptible to
use in interstate or foreign commerce ... ; all interstate wa-
ters ... ; [and] tributaries of waters identified [in the rest of
the definition]." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1998). However, the EPA
has not specifically interpreted "navigable waters" to either
include or exclude groundwater.
XXX claims that groundwater is not "navigable water"
under the CWA. In order to support this claim, XXX relies on
decisions which have specifically held that groundwater is
not "navigable water." XXX also relies on the legislative his-
tory and the language of the CWA, as well as the absence of a
reference to groundwater in EPA's definition, to argue that
groundwater is not "navigable water." If groundwater is not
"navigable water" under the CWA, then the seepage of lead
from the wastepile into the groundwater is not a discharge
prohibited by the CWA. This is because the CWA only prohib-
its discharges into "navigable water."
FOR maintains that groundwater is tributary to surface
water and therefore "navigable water." Therefore, the seep-
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age of lead from the wastepile constitutes the discharge of a
pollutant into "navigable water" without a permit. Like XXX,
FOR relies on the legislative history and language of the
CWA to support its argument. FOR also points to decisions
which have held that groundwater can be "navigable water."
FOR notes that the cases relied upon by XXX did not address
"tributary groundwater" which connects to navigable-in-fact
surface waterways. Such "tributary groundwater" has been
held to be "navigable water." The EPA has also recognized
groundwater that has a hydrological connection to ground-
water and surface water as being "waters of the United
States." National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges,
55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,997 (1990). XXX counters that the
"tributary groundwater" decision relied upon by FOR is irrel-
evant because it addressed "tributary groundwater" that was
immediately adjacent to navigable-in-fact surface waters as
opposed to being separated by a mile as in the instant case.
A. Groundwater Is Not "Navigable Water" For Purposes
Of The Clean Water Act.
1. The Clean Water Act
a) Legislative History
The legislative history of the CWA supports the assertion
that the CWA does not regulate groundwater as "navigable
water." "Several bills pending before the Committee provided
authority to establish federally approved standards for
groundwaters which permeate rock, soil, and other subsur-
face formations. Because the jurisdiction regarding ground-
waters is so complex and varied from state to state, the
Committee did not adopt this recommendation." S. Rep. No.
92-414 at 73 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3739. The CWA is not intended to address groundwater con-
tamination. The Senate was not ignorant of the hydrologic
cycle. The Senate Report stated that "[tihe Committee recog-
nizes the essential link between ground and surface waters
and the artificial nature of any distinction. Thus, the Com-
mittee bill requires in [CWA] Section 402 that each state in-
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clude in its program for approval under Section 402
affirmative controls over the injection or placement in wells of
any pollutants that may affect ground water." Id.; CWA
§ 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994). The incorporation of these two
passages in the same report suggest that the second state-
ment is not evidence of an intent to cover groundwater, as
argued by FOR.
The rejection of an amendment proposed by Representa-
tive Aspin also supports the argument that groundwater con-
tamination is not regulated under the CWA. Representative
Aspin proposed an amendment to provide enforcement over
ground water. 118 Cong. Rec. 10,666 (1972). The rejection of
the amendment "militates strongly against a judgment that
Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to en-
act." United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1383
(S.D. Tex. 1975) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,
419 U.S. 186 (1974)).
The EPA itself has refrained from including groundwater
in the agency's definition of "navigable waters." In the Pre-
amble to the NPDES Permit Application Regulations for
Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,997 (1990),
the EPA stated that "this rulemaking only addresses dis-
charges to waters of the United States, consequently dis-
charges to ground waters are not covered by this rulemaking
(unless there is a hydrological connection between the ground
water and a nearby surface water body)." Id., quoted in Lake
v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 1994).
Consistent failure to mention groundwater in regulations,
while referring to other less important types of water (such as
playa lakes) indicates there is no inclusion of groundwater in
"navigable waters."
b) The Statute
The definition of "navigable water" in Section 502, CWA
§ 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), does not indi-
cate whether the term includes groundwater. The definition
is silent on the matter. Likewise, sections of the CWA re-
garding permitting and enforcement fail to address whether
"navigable water" includes groundwater. CWA §§ 309, 402,
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505, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1342, 1365 (1994). The CWA's silence
implies the absence of groundwater from "navigable water."
In addition, navigability implies the use of a waterway by
surface water transportation. Indeed, the plain meaning of
"navigable" is "deep enough and wide enough to afford pas-
sage to ships." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
789 (9th ed. 1989).
Use of the terms "navigable water," "surface water," and
"groundwater" repeatedly throughout the CWA support the
conclusion that Congress intended "navigable water" to carry
its plain meaning as surface water. Congress never used
"navigable water" in the same sentence as "surface water" in
the CWA, rather it used the terms interchangeably in differ-
ent sentences, equating their meanings. On the other hand,
when Congress used "groundwater" it was often in conjunc-
tion with either "navigable water," CWA §§ 102(a), 104(a)(5),
106(e)(1), 304(f)(F), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), 1254(a)(5),
1256(e)(1),1314(f)(F) (1994), or "surface water," CWA
§§ 202(b)(2), 208(b)(2)(K), 502(6), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1282(b)(2),
1288(b)(2)(K), 1362(6) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Unless
"groundwater" means something other than "navigable
water" and "surface water," it is surplusage in these
sentences. Therefore, the prohibition against discharging
pollutants into "navigable waters" through permit sources
without a permit defined in CWA Sections 301(a) and 502, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), refers to dis-
charges into surface water, not groundwater.
In addition, the goal of the CWA is to attain fishable,
swimmable waters. CWA §101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)
(1994). Fishing and swimming are surface water activities.
However, groundwater is not used for fishing and swimming.
Therefore, "navigable water" does not include groundwater,
but, rather, is only limited to surface water.
c) Other Federal Statutes Relating To
Groundwater Protection
The CWA does not provide for enforcement against
groundwater contamination. Two other environmental stat-
utes, enacted after the CWA, specifically address the protec-
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tion of groundwater. Protection of groundwater by these
statutes would not be necessary if groundwater contamina-
tion was already addressed by the CWA. The fact that Con-
gress specifically addressed groundwater in other statutes
suggests it did not do so by silence in the CWA.
(1) The Safe Drinking Water Act
The Public Health Service Act (Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA)) of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1994 & Supp. II
1996), provides for the protection of underground sources of
drinking water. 42 U.S.C. § 300h. The legislative history of
the SDWA indicates that the CWA does not regulate ground-
water. The House Report stated "it appears that the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act may not authorize any regula-
tion of deep well injection of wastes which is not carried out
in conjunction with a discharge into navigable waters ....
[Therefore], the Committee has determined that broadened
and strengthened legislation to assure safe drinking water is
necessary." H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185, at 4 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6457, 6457. Like the CWA, the Adminis-
trator has control over the effectiveness of the SDWA pro-
grams. The states are required to develop programs to
prevent "underground injection which endangers drinking
water sources." 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b). If a person is not in com-
pliance with the program, the SDWA provides for civil and
criminal penalties comparable to those under the CWA. 42
U.S.C. § 300h-2. The SDWA also requires implementation of
a wellhead protection area program and a sole source aquifer
program. SDWA §§ 1427, 1428,42 U.S.C. §§ 300h-6, 300h-7
(Supp. II 1996). States must adopt and submit to the Admin-
istrator a state program to protect the "surface and subsur-
face area surrounding... water well [s] or wellfield [s]" within
their jurisdiction from contaminants which may have an ad-
verse effect on the health of persons." SDWA § 1428, 42
U.S.C. § 300h-7 (Supp. II 1996). States must also develop a
plan to protect those aquifers which are determined by the
Administrator to be the "sole or principal drinking water
source for the area." SDWA § 1427(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-6(a)
(Supp. II 1996). The SDWA provides comprehensive pro-
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grams to regulate the contamination of groundwater which is
used as a source of drinking water. Such provisions would be
unnecessary and redundant if the CWA were already regulat-
ing groundwater.
(2) The Resource Conservation And Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. § 6901-6992k (1994), also protects groundwater. Sev-
eral provisions in RCRA specifically address the protection of
groundwater. First, RCRA Section 3004(f), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6924(f), provides for regulation of deep well injection of haz-
ardous wastes. Second, RCRA regulates the disposal of liquid
in landfills if there is a danger that such disposal will contam-
inate an underground source of drinking water. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6924(c). Third, hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities must meet certain groundwater monitoring
requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(p). Finally, RCRA Sec-
tion 3020, 42 U.S.C. § 6939(b), prohibits the disposal by un-
derground injection into or above an underground source of
drinking water. RCRA specifies that "the prohibitions ...
shall be enforceable under the Safe Drinking Water Act... in
any State ... which has adopted identical or more stringent
prohibitions under the Safe Drinking Water Act . . . and
which has assumed primary enforcement responsibility
under that Act . . . for enforcement of such prohibitions."
RCRA § 3020, 42 U.S.C. § 6939b (1994). It would be inconsis-
tent for RCRA to provide for enforcement of groundwater
under the SDWA but not under the CWA if both acts regulate
the contamination of groundwater. Moreover, regulation of
groundwater contamination from hazardous waste treat-
ment, storage, and disposal facilities would be unnecessary
and redundant if such facilities were already regulated as





a) EPA Jurisdiction Over Deep Well Injection
In two early cases, EPA asserted limited jurisdiction over
contamination of groundwater by means of the discharge of
pollutants through injection wells. See Exxon Corp. v. Train,
554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. GAF Corp.,
389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975). EPA's theory was that
states had to have authority to control injection wells in order
for EPA to approve their permit programs, CWA
§ 402(b)(1)(D), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D) (1994), and EPA's
own permit authority was the same as the states'. CWA
§ 402(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3) (1994). In GAF, EPA
sought to enjoin the construction and operation of an injec-
tion well without a permit. GAF, 389 F. Supp. at 1379. The
court easily denied the injunction, holding EPA had no juris-
diction over discharges of pollutants into groundwater. See
Id. at 1387. The court held that CWA Section 402(a)(3), 33
U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3) (1994), does not incorporate the require-
ment for authority to "control the disposal of pollutants into
wells." GAF, 389 F. Supp. at 1384. "Congress could not pos-
sibly have meant to achieve in a roundabout fashion what it
expressly declined to accomplish straightforwardly." Id. The
GAF court relied on Senate Report No. 92-414 which stated
that the Committee did not adopt bills that were pending
which "provided authority to establish federally approved
standards for groundwaters which permeate rock, soil, and
other subsurface formations ... [b]ecause the jurisdiction re-
garding groundwaters is so complex and varied from state to
state." Id. at 1383 (citing S. Rep. 92-414 at 73).
In the second case, Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310
(5th Cir. 1977), the holder of an EPA issued permit, limiting
its discharges to both surface and groundwater, challenged
the permit on the basis that EPA had no jurisdiction to issue
a permit governing deep well injection. Id. at 1311. In hold-
ing the EPA lacked jurisdiction over discharges to ground-
water, the court examined provisions in the CWA addressing
groundwater. See id. at 1318. First, the court identified
three sections providing a plan for the EPA and states to de-
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velop information to control groundwater. Exxon, 554 F.2d at
1323. See CWA §§ 102(a), 104(a)(5), 106, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1252(a), 1254(a)(5), 1256 (1994). Second, the court found
two provisions referring to the "power of the federal purse to
encourage protection by the states of underground waters"
and make funding dependent on a showing by the state that
the "quantity of available ground water will be insufficient,
inadequate, or unsuitable for public use" and the "area-wide
treatment plants include the process to control the disposal of
pollutants on land or in subsurface excavations within such
area to protect ground and surface water quality." Exxon,
554 F.2d at 1323. CWA § 208(b)(2)(K), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1288(b)(2)(K) (1994). Finally, the court examined CWA Sec-
tion 304(b), regarding guidelines to be transformed into en-
forceable limitations in NPDES permits. § 304(b), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b) (1994). Groundwater is not mentioned in Section
304(b), but is mentioned in other subsections of 304. See
CWA §§ 304(a),(f), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(a),(f) (1994). These
other subsections, however, are not translated into enforcea-
ble permit limits for surface water discharges. Congress in-
tended the federal government to develop information
regarding groundwater pollution. See id. However, "the ab-
sence of other provisions in the CWA, analogous to Section
301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1994), for transforming this in-
formation into enforceable limitations, strongly suggests that
Congress meant to stop short of establishing federal controls
over groundwater pollution." Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d
at 1324. The court noted that CWA Section 402(b)(1)(D), 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D) (1994), which requires the state permit
program to have control over disposal of pollutants into wells,
is not "fleshed out elsewhere in the CWA or mirrored in any
of the sections setting forth the Administrator's powers." Id.
at 1324. The fact that the states have the authority to control
what goes into wells is consistent with the intent that the fed-
eral government provide information and funding to the
states regarding groundwater contamination but leaving to
the states the control of groundwater contamination. See id.
This arrangement with states controlling groundwater was
the method Congress elected to take "while the Administra-
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tor began assembling the information needed for Congress to
legislate intelligently on the subject." Id. at 1329. The Exxon
court held that the intention was partly achieved two years
later when Congress enacted the SDWA.
Thus, EPA's very limited assertion of jurisdiction over
contamination of groundwater was rejected by the courts and
appears to have been abandoned by EPA. The limited nature
of EPA's assertion of groundwater - deep well injection in
conjunction with surface water discharge - is significant, un-
derlying EPA's disavowal of broad jurisdiction over contami-
nation of groundwater.
b) EPA Jurisdiction Over Discharges To Tributary
Groundwater
Courts have held that the discharge of pollutants to
groundwater which is tributary to surface water does not re-
quire an NPDES permit. In a recent case, Umatilla Water-
Quality Protective Ass'n v. Smith Frozen Foods, 962 F. Supp.
1312 (D. Or. 1997), the court held that even groundwater
with a hydrological connection to surface water is not covered
by NPDES permitting. Id. at 1318. The court based its hold-
ing on several grounds. First, when Congress wanted the
statute to apply to groundwater elsewhere in the CWA, Con-
gress expressly stated so. See id. Second, the legislative his-
tory supported the argument that the CWA was not intended
to regulate discharges into groundwater. See id. Third, the
EPA had not provided a "formal and consistent" interpreta-
tion that groundwater is subject to NPDES permitting. Id. at
1319. Finally, the court wanted to avoid the "practical conse-
quences to water quality regulation if [the court] were to in-
clude hydrologically-connected groundwater within the
NPDES permit program... [Allthough in some cases.., the
fact that groundwater connects to surface water is relatively
easy to discern, such connections are often not obvious." Id.
at 320. See also Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton
Hudson, 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding groundwater
that is hydrologically connected with surface waters is not
regulated by the Clean Water Act); Kelley v. United States,
618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (concluding NPDES pro-
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gram does not extend to groundwater that is connected to
surface water).
The court decisions, legislative history, and the language
of the statute support this Court finding that the seepage of
lead from the wastepile, subsequently contaminating ground-
water, is not a violation of the CWA. The CWA prohibits the
contamination of "navigable water." Groundwater is not
"navigable water." Congress intended to regulate the con-
tamination of groundwater through the SDWA. The CWA is
limited to protecting surface waters.
B. Groundwater Is "Navigable Water" For Purposes Of
The Clean Water Act.
1. The Clean Water Act And EPA Regulations
a) The Legislative History
The legislative history of the CWA emphasizes the broad
reach of the term "navigable water." The Senate Report illus-
trates the intent to protect tributaries of "navigable waters."
The Senate Report stated:
The control strategy of the Act extends to navigable wa-
ters. The definition of this term means the navigable wa-
ters of the United States, portions thereof, tributaries
thereof, and includes the territorial seas and the Great
Lakes. Through a narrow interpretation of the definition
of interstate waters the implementation [of the] 1965 Act
was severely limited. Water moves in hydrologic cycles
and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled
at the source. Therefore, reference to the control require-
ments must be made to the navigable waters, portions
thereof, and their tributaries.
S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 77 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3742-3743. Representative Dingell, Chief
Sponsor in the House, stated that "navigable waters" are,"all
the 'waters of the United States' in a geographical sense. It
does not mean 'navigable waters of the United States' in the
technical sense as we sometimes see in some laws .... Thus,
this new definition clearly encompasses all water bodies, in-
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cluding main streams and their tributaries, for water quality
purposes." Mary Christina Wood, Regulating Discharges Into
Groundwater: The Crucial Link in Pollution Control Under
the Clean Water Act, 12 HIAiv. ENVTL. L. REV. 569, 589 (1988)
[hereinafter Wood] (citing 1 A Legislative History of the
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 at 250
(1973) [hereinafter Legislative History]. Although Represen-
tative Kemp did not specifically mention groundwater, he did
note that the intent of the CWA is to reach the full extent of
Commerce Clause jurisdiction. The fact that the reach of the
Commerce Clause extends to groundwater is evidenced by
groundwater regulation in various federal statutes. Repre-
sentative Kemp also noted that "for the first time groundwa-
ters have been given the same emphasis as surface waters...
(the CWA is) an important step forward in the protection of
the underground environment." United States Steel Corp. v.
Train, 556 F.2d 822, 852 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Legislative
History at 250).
The House rejected Representative Aspin's proposed
amendment which would have expanded federal regulation of
groundwater. However, the rejection does not necessarily
mean that the House was rejecting federal regulation over
groundwater. First, the amendment may have been consid-
ered redundant because groundwater was already contem-
plated by the CWA. Second, the amendment also proposed to
delete the oil and gas injections exception in CWA Section
502(6)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)(B) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). See
Steel, 556 F.2d at 852 n. 66. The debate focused on the intent
to "eliminate the inconsistency between the way we treat oil
companies and the way we treat other companies .... The oil
industry does it .... [Yet] waste injection wells of the steel
industry are covered. The waste injection wells of every in-
dustry except oil are covered." Steel, 556 F.2d at 852 (quoting
Legislative History at 589-590 (remarks of Rep. Aspin)). The
argument in opposition to the Amendment was that "we have
more stringent regulations now on the oil industry than we
could ever impose through this legislation." Steel, 556 F.2d at
852 (quoting Legislative History at 589-590 (remarks of Rep.
Roberts). "The House debate on the amendment, therefore,
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confirms [the] conclusion that the Act contemplates state and
federal restrictions on waste disposals into wells." Steel, 556
F.2d at 852.
b) Permitting Authority
An analysis of the permitting section of the CWA indi-
cates that the Administrator has jurisdiction over discharges
into wells which may contaminate groundwater. The CWA
provides that state permit programs "shall be approved by
the Administrator only if adequate authority exists to ...
issue permits which . . . [inter alia] control the disposal of
pollutants into wells." CWA § 402(b)(1)(D), 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(b)(1)(D) (1994). The CWA also requires that the Administra-
tor's permit program is "subject to the same terms, condi-
tions, and requirements as apply to a state permit program."
CWA § 402(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3) (1994). The basic
prohibition of the CWA is against the discharge of pollutants
into "navigable waters" without permits. CWA §§ 301(a), 502,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Yet, injec-
tions into wells are discharges into groundwater. If the Ad-
ministrator has authority to issue permits for injection of
pollutants into wells, then groundwater must be "navigable
water."
An Opinion Letter from the Office of the General Counsel
specifically addressed whether the EPA has authority to reg-
ulate the injection into wells of industrial waste by NPDES
permits. Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1321 n. 21 (5th
Cir. 1977) (quoting Opinion Letter from the Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel, December 13, 1973). The Office of General
Counsel stated that "the EPA has authority to control well
injection through conditions in NPDES permits issued for
discharges into navigable waters. See id. The Office of Gen-
eral Counsel added "that disposal of pollutants into wells is
subject to regulation through conditions in an NPDES permit
issued for an associated surface water discharge." Id.
If CWA Section 402(a)(3) is interpreted not to incorporate
Section 402(b)(1)(D), two inconsistencies result. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1342(a)(3), (b)(1)(D); Wood, supra, at 604. First, authority
to regulate wells rested in the states and not in the federal
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government. See Wood, supra, at 604. The Administrator
has the authority to approve or deny the state program based
on whether the program has adequate authority to fulfill the
federally mandated requirements. See CWA § 402(b), 33
U.S.C §1342(b) (1994). However, the Administrator could not
implement the condition himself. See id. Second, there
would be jurisdiction to control deep well injection to ground-
water in states with EPA approved state permit programs
but not in states in which the permit program is adminis-
tered the federal government. See Wood, supra, at 604.
c) The Definitions
The definitions also provide insight into whether or not
Congress intended the CWA to regulate groundwater. First,
it has been mentioned that the discharge of a pollutant into
"navigable waters" from a point source is forbidden under the
CWA. CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994 & Supp. II
1996). According to the CWA, a well is a "point source." CWA
§ 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Wells
empty into underground water and not surface water. The
only reason for wells to be included in the definition of "point
source" is to protect against the contamination of
groundwater.
Second, a discharge is only prohibited if it discharges
into "navigable waters." At one time the term "navigable
water" generally referred to waters which could be navigated
in fact. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870). Over the
years, the concept of navigable waters has continued to ex-
pand. The definition of "navigable water" in the CWA is "wa-
ters of the United States." CWA section 502(7), 33 U.S.C
§ 1362(7) (1994).
The Act's definition of 'navigable waters' as the 'waters of
the United States' makes it clear that the term 'navigable'
as used in the Act is of limited import. In adopting this
definition . . . Congress evidently intended to repudiate
limits that had been in place on federal regulation by ear-
lier water pollution control statutes and to exercise its
powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least
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some waters that would not be deemed to be 'navigable'
under the classical understanding of that term.
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
133 (1985). Due to the broad interpretation of the term, there
is no reason "navigable waters" should be limited to surface
waters. Rather, "navigable water" should be interpreted to
regulate all waters which affect commerce.
Finally, the CWA only prohibits discharges of "pollu-
tants." The definition of "pollutant" in the CWA excludes in-
jections into wells relating to the production of oil or gas if the
"[sitate determines that such injection or disposal will not re-
sult in the degradation of ground or surface water resources."
CWA § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. 1362(6) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The
exception was intended to assure that no injection or disposal
occur in such a manner as to present a potential hazard to
ground water quality. United States Steel Corp. v. Train,
556 F.2d 822, 852 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Legislative History
at 178 (remarks of Senator Muskie)). The exclusion of certain
types of injections into wells indicates that the remaining in-
jections fall within the definition of "pollutant." The excep-
tion also demonstrates that Congress intended to prevent
harm to groundwater quality from injections and disposal.
The EPA's definition of "navigable water" includes
tributaries. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1998). Groundwater
serves as a tributary to "navigable water." EPA's definition
does not exclude groundwater. Therefore, EPA's definition
includes groundwater by implication.
i) Other Federal Statutes Addressing Groundwater
Other federal statutes which address the regulation of
groundwater expressly recognize the jurisdiction of the CWA.
The SDWA is not intended to replace the CWA:
Except for the provisions of section 302 (relating to the
transfer of funds)... nothing in this Act or in any amend-
ments . . . shall be construed by the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency or the courts as affect-
ing, modifying, expanding, changing, or altering . . . the
provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ...
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the duties and responsibilities of the Administrator under
that Act ...or the regulation or control of point or non-
point sources of pollution discharged into waters covered
by that Act.
SDWA § 1401, 42 U.S.C. § 300f (Supp. II 1996); see also Safe
Drinking Water Amendments of 1996, 110 Stat. 1614, Aug. 6,
1996, Pub. L. No. §§ 104-182 § 2(c). The purpose of the
SDWA is to "assure that water supply systems serving the
public meet minimum national standards for protection of
public health." H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 6457. The Committee acknowledged that
legislation was needed because no current laws adequately
assured safe drinking water sources. Id. The purposes of the
two acts are different. The goal of the CWA is to attain
fishable, swimmable water. CWA §101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2) (1994). The purpose of the SDWA is to regulate
those public water systems to provide clean drinking water at
the tap. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1).
The Sole Source Aquifer Demonstration Program of the
SDWA only protects those critical aquifers which are the "sole
or principal drinking water source for the area ... which, if
contaminated, would create a significant hazard to public
health." SDWA § 1424(e), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(e) (Supp. II
1996). The program does not protect all aquifers. Therefore,
the regulation of groundwater under the SDWA does not pre-
clude regulation under the CWA.
RCRA does not replace CWA jurisdiction over ground-
water either. RCRA states "nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to apply to ...any activity or substance which
is subject to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ....
[or] the Safe Drinking Water Act . . . , except to the extent
that such application (or regulation) is not inconsistent with
the requirements of such Act." RCRA § 1006(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6905(a) (1994). The two Acts are intended to be treated
harmoniously. In fact, RCRA requires the "Administrator
[to] integrate all provisions of this chapter for purposes of ad-
ministration and enforcement and shall .. .duplication, to
the maximum extent practicable, with the appropriate provi-
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sions of... the Federal Water Pollution Control Act... [and]
the Safe Drinking Water Act." RCRA § 1006(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6905(b) (1994). Even in the CWA required permits for dis-
charges to groundwater from point sources, the SDWA and
RCRA would still be needed to protect groundwater from con-
tamination from non-point sources.
2. Precedent
Courts have read the CWA broadly and recognized that
some groundwater is tributary groundwater and therefore
subject to regulation under the CWA. Over the years, the
courts have held that the authority under the CWA is as ex-
tensive as the Commerce Clause of the United States Consti-
tution permits. In United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665
(M.D. Fla. 1974), the court held that "federal authority over
water pollution properly rests on the Commerce Clause and
not on past interpretations of an act designed to protect navi-
gation." Id. at 676. Every body of water that may be affected
by interstate commerce in any way is subject to regulation.
See United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375
(10th Cir. 1979). The jurisdiction of the CWA is the maxi-
mum extent of the Commerce Clause. See Deltona Corp. v.
United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1186 (Ct. Cl. 1981). As a result,
courts have held that the CWA provides authority to regulate
all waters geographically within the borders of the United
States. See United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp., Co., 504
F.2d 1317, 1324 (6th Cir. 1974); PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Train,
393 F. Supp. 1370, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (concluding reach all
waters of the United States in the geographic sense in order
to control pollution at its source). The authority under the
Commerce Clause extends to regulation of groundwater.
Groundwater is used as a source of drinking water and irriga-
tion, which affect interstate commerce. Groundwater also
flows into rivers, lakes, and other surface waters which are
recognized as falling within the jurisdiction of the Commerce
Clause. In Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), the
Supreme Court held that groundwater is an article of inter-
state commerce. Id. at 953-954.
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a) EPA And The Courts Recognize Tributaries As
"Navigable Waters"
The abandonment of the concept of physically navigable
waters in defining "navigable waters" has led both EPA and
the courts to include non-navigable tributaries in the defini-
tion. EPA includes tributaries to lakes, rivers, and other
waterbodies as "waters of the United States." 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2 (1998). Therefore, tributaries to surface waters are
"navigable water."
The court in United States v. Ashland Oil & Transporta-
tion Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974), recognized that tribu-
tary waters were intended to be covered by the CWA. See id.
at 1329. If tributaries were not protected, the navigable-in-
fact waters into which contaminated tributaries flowed would
be polluted, as well as the tributaries themselves. The Ash-
land Oil court addressed the issue of whether contamination
of a tributary, which was separated from a navigable water-
way by two other tributaries was a violation of the CWA. See
Ashland, 504 F.2d at 1320. The court did not require any evi-
dence that the pollutants from the tributary ever reached the
navigable-in-fact waterway. See id. at 1329. The court recog-
nized the "impossibility of such proof in many if not all cases."
Id.
In United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345
(10th Cir. 1979), the court was faced with a similar question.
Contaminants were discharged into a tributary separated
from a navigable-in-fact waterway by three tributaries. See
Texas Pipe Line, 611 F.2d at 346-347. No evidence was
presented as to whether the intermediate streams were flow-
ing. See id. at 347. The likelihood of the pollutants reaching
the navigable waterway was small. See id. Furthermore, the
court could not determine a link between the contaminated
tributary and interstate commerce. See id. Nevertheless, the
court held that a violation of the CWA had occurred. See id.
In Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir.
1985), there were discharges of pollutants into otherwise dry
arroyos. See id. at 129. Any flow in the arroyos only
progressed a short distance. See id. The connection of the
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arroyos with navigable-in-fact water occurred only when
there were heavy rains. See id. Some of the flow did continue
through underground aquifers to the navigable waterway.
See id. The court found that the occasional surface flow in
addition to the underground flow were sufficient to character-
ize arroyos as tributaries. See id. at 139.
b) Groundwater
Courts addressing the inclusion of groundwater tributa-
ries within the jurisdiction of the CWA focus on the connec-
tion between the tributaries and navigable waterways. In
some cases the connection has been tenuous. Nevertheless,
courts have held that discharges to groundwater tributaries
are regulated by the CWA. Groundwaters, as part of the hy-
drologic cycle, serve as tributaries to surface waters and are
therefore subject to regulation under the CWA.
In Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892
F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1995), there was contamination of an
arroyo. Id. at 1356. The court recognized the arroyo may be
subject to regulation under the CWA if "the water from [the]
arroyo . .. eventually winds its way to interstate waters or
waters affecting interstate commerce." Id. at 1356. The
plaintiffs must "provide some evidence to suggest that water
originating in the Arroyo near the overburden has at least at
some time in the past eventually made its way to the Rio
Grande, either by way of the Arroyo and [the creek] or
through the groundwater, and is reasonably likely to do so
again." Id. at 1357. The court recognized that in general,
"hydrologically connected groundwaters are regulated waters
of the United States." Id. at 1358. Other courts have also
held that groundwater which, is hydrologically connected to
surface water, is regulated by the CWA. See Steel, 56 F.2d at
853 (concluding that regulation of deep well injection, at least
when regulation is in conjunction with limitation on the per-
mittees discharge into surface waters, is permissible); Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Mobil Corp., No. CIV.A.96-CV1781,
1998 WL 160820 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998) (holding that if
there is a hydrologic connection, but not a general connection,
with surface waters, the groundwater is regulated by
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NPDES); Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp.
1300 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (determining that if groundwater is
hydrologically connected to surface waters then it is "naviga-
ble water"); Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Min-
ing Co., 870 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (holding that
groundwater is covered if can trace from source to surface
water); Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 838 F. Supp.
1428 (D. Colo. 1993) (concluding that groundwater connected
to surface water is regulated by the NPDES program); Mc-
Clellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F.
Supp. 1182 (E.D. Cal. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 47
F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995), and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 51 (1995)
(determining that there must be a showing groundwater is
connected to the surface water).
The lead from the wastepile on XXX's property perme-
ates the soil to the groundwater. The groundwater flows as a
tributary in the direction of the Roaritan River. Courts have
held and EPA has interpreted "water of the United States" to
include tributaries. See e.g., United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985); Umatilla
Water-Quality Protectice Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1314-1315 (D. Or. 1997). Other
courts have held that groundwater which is connected to sur-
face water is "navigable water" for purposes of the CWA. See
e.g., Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp.
1300, 1319 (S.D. Iowa 1997); Friends of Santa Fe County v.
LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1358 (D.N.M. 1995).
Decisions such as United States v. GAF, 389 F. Supp. 1379
(S.D. Tex. 1975), and Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310
(5th Cir. 1977), do not preclude such findings that discharges
to tributary groundwater, such as the groundwater at issue
in the instant case, are controlled by NPDES permitting.
Both courts held that discharges to the relevant groundwater
are not subject to control by NPDES permitting. See GAF,
389 F. Supp. At 1384; Exxon, 554 F.2d at 1320. However, the
GAF decision was based on the discharge of pollutants into
wells with no discussion of a connection between the ground-
water and surface waters. GAF, 389 F. Supp. At 1383. The
Exxon court also expressly limited its holding to groundwa-
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ters with no connection to surface waters. Exxon, 554 F.2d at
1312 n.1. The Exxon court "express[ed] no opinion on what
the result would be if [the groundwaters were alleged to be
connected to surface waters]." Id.
II. WHETHER THE CHALLENGE TO SECTION
IIA3 OF THE PERMIT REQUIRING
COMPLIANCE WITH WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS IS TIME-BARRED.
Section 509(b)(1) of the CWA provides for judicial review
of a permit within 120 days after it is issued and Section
509(b)(2) bars judicial review thereafter if review could have
been had under 509(b)(1). CWA §§ 509(b)(1)-(2), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1369(b)(1)-(2) (1994). Review of a permit condition which
is not ripe for review within that 120-day period may be had
when it becomes ripe. XXX may therefore challenge the va-
lidity of the water quality requirement of the permit in a case
seeking to enforce that requirement only if that requirement
was not ripe when the permit was issued. If Congress articu-
lates a statutory time limitation for judicial review, the action
will be time-barred if the statutory time period has run and
the action has not been brought. Therefore, a conflict be-
tween ripeness and timeliness arises when a challenge, sub-
ject to a statutory time limitation for judicial review, is not
ripe during the statutory time period.
A court may only hear a challenge to an action of an ad-
ministrative agency if the action is ripe for judicial review.
The courts have developed tests to determine whether or not
an action is ripe for review. The Supreme Court articulated a
two-fold inquiry. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
149 (1967). In order to determine whether an issue is ripe for
review, a court must 1) determine whether the issue
presented is fit for judicial resolution, and 2) assess the hard-
ship to the parties if judicial relief is denied at the stage in
which it is before the court. See id.; see also Toilet Goods
Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967). The rationale behind
limiting judicial review to those actions which are ripe is to
"prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from
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entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over ad-
ministrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from ju-
dicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the chal-
lenging parties." Abbott, 387 U.S. at 148. The "fitness of the
issues" test requires consideration of the "institutional capac-
ities of, and the relationship between, courts and agencies."
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir.
1985). If the issue is a purely legal question the court should
"assume its threshold suitability for judicial determination."
Id. The court should also "consider whether the agency or the
court will benefit from deferring review until the agency's pol-
icies have crystallized and the 'question arises in some more
concrete and final form."' Id. The second prong of the ripe-
ness test requires a determination as to whether or not any
harm to a petitioner will outweigh the benefits to the agency
and the court if review is deferred. See id. at 918.
XXX argues that the challenge to the permit condition
was not ripe when the permit was issued. Consequently, the
issue was not ripe during the statutory time period. The
challenge requires a more concrete factual context on which
the Court can base its decision. When the permit was issued,
it contained a blanket prohibition on violating state water
quality standards. It was impossible for XXX to know the ex-
tent to which that limited its discharge of any particular pol-
lutant or to anticipate that the requirement would subject it
to standards promulgated under another act, the SDWA,
which was intended to regulate drinking water utilities.
Therefore, XXX argues the statutory time period should not
have began to run when the permit was issued.
FOR claims that the challenge to the permit condition
must have been brought during the statutory time period and
that the opportunity for review is now lost. According to the
CWA, any challenge which could have been brought during
the statutory time-period and was not brought cannot be
raised in an enforcement proceeding. In addition, FOR ar-
gues the issue of whether or not a water quality standard
must be reduced to numerical or other specific requirements
in a permit is a purely legal issue, requiring no factual con-
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text. The issue was therefore ripe during the statutory time
period. Even if XXX did not believe the issue was ripe for
review during the statutory time period, XXX was required to
bring the challenge during the statutory time period and
await determination by the court as to whether the issue was
ripe for review.
A. The Challenge To The Permit Section Was Ripe When
The Permit Was Issued And Is Now Time-Barred.
1. The Clean Water Act
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) establishes a
presumption that a final agency action is subject to judicial
review. APA §§ 702, 704, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1994). In en-
acting the CWA, Congress recognized that preclusion of judi-
cial review of "matters committed by statute to
administrative discretion," S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 85 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3750, "requires a show-
ing of clear evidence of legislative intent." Id. (quoting Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, (C.A. No. 23,813, May 28,
1970); see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970);
Abbott, 387 U.S. at 140-141. As a result, Congress expressly
limited the time period for judicial review of agency actions in
CWA Section 509. The Senate Report reveals the congres-
sional intent behind Section 509:
The Courts have granted this review to those being regu-
lated and to those who seek to 'protect the public interest
in the proper administration of a regulatory system en-
acted for their benefit.' Since precluding review would not
appear to be warranted or desirable, the bill would specifi-
cally provide for such review within controlled time periods
.... In order to maintain the integrity of the time se-
quences provided throughout the Act, the section would
provide that any review sought must be filed within 30 [to-
day, 1201 days of the date of the challenged promulgation
or other action.
S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 85 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3750-51 (citations omitted). This indi-
cates the Senate intended that judicial review should be
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/4
BENCH MEMORANDUM
available to a limited extent. The limitation was intended to
protect "the integrity of the time sequences provided through-
out the Act.... ." S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 85 (1972), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3751. The report acknowledged
only one exception to the statutory limitation:
In the area of protection of public health and environmen-
tal quality, it is clear that new information will be devel-
oped and that such information may dictate a revision or
modification of any promulgated standard, requirement, or
regulation established under the act. The judicial review
section, therefore, provides that any person may challenge
any requirement after the date of promulgation whenever
it is alleged that significant new information has become
available.
S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 85 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3751. Congress included this exception to
the time limitation in the judicial review section of the CWA.
See CWA § 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1994).
2. Precedent
a) The Challenge To The Permit Is Not Timely
The CWA requires judicial review of the issuance or de-
nial of a permit be sought within 120 days of the permit being
issued or denied. CWA § 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)
(1994). Therefore, any challenge to a permit condition must
also be sought within 120 days of the permit being issued.
See Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Yates Indus.,
757 F. Supp. 438 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding failure to seek review
of bioassay parameters in permit pursuant to state agency
procedures and time limitations precluded review by the
court); Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of
Am., Inc. v. Costle, 571 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1978); Sun Enters.
v. Train, 532 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976).
In Texas Municipal Power Agency v. EPA, 799 F.2d 173
(5th Cir. 1986), the court held that it lacked the power to re-
view an agency action brought after the statutory time period
for judicial review had lapsed. The Fifth Circuit recognized
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that "time limitations impart finality to the administrative
process, thus conserving administrative resources .... The
requirements show a congressional decision to impose statu-
tory finality on agency actions that we, as a court, may not
second-guess." Id. at 175.
The Sixth Circuit held similarly. The court in Peabody
Coal Co. v. Train, noted that the "court is not given to harsh
application of statutes of limitation . . . . But [the court
found] no facts ... which suggest[ed] equitable tolling of [the
Clean Water Act]." Peabody, 518 F.2d 940, 942 (6th Cir.
1975). The court stated that it was being asked to judicially
amend the CWA by extending the statute of limitations and
refused to do so. See id. The court noted the sense of urgency
in the CWA to protect the environment was similar to that in
the CAA, and that sense of urgency was one factor explaining
Congress' desire to compress judicial review of requirements
established under the two acts. The court therefore based its
decision in part on the decisions of other courts which had
enforced similar statutory time limits in the CAA. See id. at
943 (citing Granite City Steel Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 925 (7th
Cir. 1974)); See also Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206
(8th Cir. 1975); Getty Oil (E. Oper Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467
F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973)). A
party making a CWA Section 509 challenge to an action of the
administrator must "do so within ninety days or lose forever
the right to do so, even though that action might eventually
result in the imposition of severe civil or criminal penalties."
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 673 F.2d
400, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
b) Challenge Was Ripe When Permit Was Issued
If a court were to apply the ripeness test, despite the
strict time limitation in CWA Section 509, CWA § 509, 33
U.S.C. § 1369 (1994), the court would have to conclude that
the permit challenge was ripe for review when issued. The
first part of the ripeness test, whether the issue is fit for re-
view, is met in the instant case. Whether or not a water qual-
ity standard must be reduced to a numerical or specific
limitation is a purely legal question and, as such, does not
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require a concrete factual context or an attempt at enforce-
ment for resolution.
In Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), the court held that under circumstances like these
it is not necessary to proceed to the "hardship" analysis if the
first prong is met. Id. at 918. The court noted that "[w]here
the first prong of the ripeness test is met and Congress has
emphatically declared a preference for immediate review, as-
suming that constitutional case or controversy requirements
have been met, no purpose is served by proceeding to the sec-
ond prong." Id. at 918. Therefore, it would not be necessary
for the court to proceed to the second prong in the instant
case.
Those cases which have found issues were not ripe dur-
ing the statutory time period involved review of the Adminis-
trator's actions which do "not command anyone to do
anything or refrain from anything;... do not grant, withhold,
or modify any formal legal license, power or authority;.., do
not subject anyone to any civil or criminal liability; [and] cre-
ate no legal rights or obligations." Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Si-
erra Club, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 1670 (1998); see also Toilet Goods
Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Am. Forest and Paper
Ass'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that
"no facts awaiting development.., would aid our decision; to
the extent any factual questions even exist, they are over-
shadowed by the legal question that towers over this case");
Westvaco Corp. v. EPA, 899 F.2d 1383 (4th Cir. 1990); Com-
monwealth Edison, Co. v. Train, 649 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1980).
The deferral of judicial review of such actions, of course, did
not cause a hardship on any party. The instant case is not
such a case. The case here involves an EPA action that im-
poses new legal obligations on permittees created by every
state water quality standard and subjects such permittees to
civil or criminal liability if they violated any state water qual-
ity standard. The deferral of judicial review of such actions
would cause permittees substantial hardship. These are not
the circumstances under which courts withhold review dur-
ing the statutory time periods for review on ripeness grounds.
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c) Waiver Of Judicial Review
Some courts "generally refuse to allow late petitions even
when petitioners argue that their claims were unripe during
the original [statutory] period." Ass. of Am. R.Rs. v. Surface
Transp. Bd., 146 F.3d 942, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc., v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 914 (D.C. Cir.
1985)). Even if the challenge was not ripe when the permit
was issued, XXX waived review by not seeking it during the
statutory time period. The court of appeals in Eagle-Picher
Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1985), examined
the relationship between timeliness and ripeness. Id. at 912.
Timeliness requirements are jurisdictional. See id. at 911.
Such requirements are "a deliberate congressional choice to
impose statutory finality on agency orders which we may not
second-guess." Id. They are designed to avoid judicial review
of "disputes which Congress has determined have been raised
too late and to protect agencies from endless judicial interfer-
ence with formalized administrative policy." Id. at 913. The
court of appeals warned "petitioners of the wisdom of filing
protective petitions for review during the statutory period."
Id. at 912 (citations omitted).
Ripeness issues involve the "competence of the courts to
resolve disputes without further administrative refinement of
issues." Id. Ripeness is generally a look forward to deter-
mine the impact of postponing review. See Eagle-Picher, 759
F.2d at 913. Courts rarely look backward to determine
whether a court would have found the issue ripe for review
had it been brought during the statutory period. See id. The
court of appeals explained the reluctance of courts to perform
a retrospective ripeness analysis:
Courts are simply not well-suited to answering hypotheti-
cal questions which involve guessing what the court might
have done in the past .... Furthermore, if we were to rou-
tinely conduct retrospective ripeness analysis where a late
petitioner offers no compelling justification for not having
filed his claim in a timely manner, we would wreak havoc




Id. at 914. XXX's challenge to the permit condition is not
timely. XXX should have petitioned for review during the
statutory time period. Of course, a court may have found the
issue was not ripe for review at that time. But if the court
had heard the issue and determined it was not ripe, XXX
would have preserved its right of review when the issue be-
came ripe. Instead of bringing its challenge during the statu-
tory period, XXX substituted its own judgment of ripeness for
that of the court and concluded that the challenge was not
ripe for review because it required a more concrete factual
context, such as when an enforcement action is brought. XXX
is asking the Court to perform a retrospective ripeness analy-
sis to validate XXX's judgment that the court would have
found the issue unripe if the action had been brought during
the statutory time period. Courts are reluctant to do such an
analysis because it violates the policy behind the statutory
time limitations. There are no compelling justifications for
XXX's failure to bring a timely challenge.
B. The Issue Was Not Ripe When The Permit Was Issued
And Should Be Heard Now.
The court may only hear issues which are ripe. Judicial
review of an issue which is ambiguous should be postponed
until there is a concrete factual context. If a claim is unripe
during the statutory period and the statutory time period is
the only time a challenge may be brought, petitioners would
be denied their day in court. Therefore, the time limitation
cannot begin to run until the issue becomes ripe. See Balti-
more Gas & Elec. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 672
F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The time bar in CWA Section
509(b)(2) is consistent with this. CWA § 509(b)(2), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b)(2) (1994). It operates only if review "could have
been obtained" within the 120-day period. Id. If an issue was
not ripe for review during that period and review, therefore,
could not have been had during that period, the time bar did
not operate. Petitioners did not have to seek review during
the 120-day period, if issues were obviously not ripe, simply
to preserve its claim once they become ripe. That result
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would require two judicial actions which would be an obvious
waste of judicial resources.
In the instant case, the issue of whether the permit con-
dition is enforceable was not ripe for judicial review during
the statutory time period of 120 days following issuance of
the permit. The issue is ambiguous and requires a concrete
factual record, which was not present when the permit was
issued. The permit contains a blanket prohibition on violat-
ing state water quality standards. As a result of the ambigu-
ity of the permit condition, XXX cannot know by how much it
must limit its discharge of any particular pollutant or predict
the prohibition would subject it to standards promulgated
under the SDWA, which was intended to regulate drinking
water utilities rather than prevent the contamination of
groundwater. In addition, the prohibition requires compli-
ance with state law water quality standards which may be-
come effective after the permit is issued. At the time of
permit issuance, XXX cannot anticipate every water quality
standard it may challenge. Therefore, XXX argues the statu-
tory time period should not have began to run when the per-
mit was issued. Enforcement of the permit condition
provides a concrete factual context on which the court may
base its decision. When the condition is enforced, the court
may specifically see how the permit condition is applied and
how it effects petitioners. Postponing the start of the statu-
tory time period until the court has a concrete factual context
for determination is consistent with the purpose of the time
limitation.
1. The Clean Water Act And Precedent
Under the CWA, only particular actions by the Adminis-
trator are subject to judicial review in the courts of appeals,
including the issuance or denial of a permit. See CWA
§ 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1994). Challenge to the issu-
ance or denial of a permit must be brought within 120 days of
the determination, promulgation, issuance, denial, or ap-
proval, or the opportunity to do so will be lost. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b)(2) (1994). However, the time bar of CWA Section
509(b)(2) has not been strictly construed. Courts have post-
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poned review of actions of the Administrator when a more
concrete factual record is required.
In American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA, 115 F.3d
979 (D.C. Cir. 1997), several associations and an environmen-
tal group petitioned for judicial review of the EPA's Final
Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lake System. Am.
Iron, 115 F.3d at 999. American Iron and Steel Institute
(AISI) challenged the substance of the EPA guidance. See id.
One such challenge was to EPA's interpretation of the Act
that the return of a pollutant to the waterbody from which it
was taken (referred to as an "intake pollutant") was an "addi-
tion" of the pollutant to the waterbody. Id. The court held
this issue was not ripe for review. See id. Whether the dis-
charge of an intake pollutant can be considered an "addition"
"cannot be answered in the abstract ... [t]he court must con-
sider a variety of factors." Id. The American Iron and Steel
Institute maintained that the "interpretation [of the statute
regarding 'addition'] can be adjudged erroneous quite apart
from any factual considerations." Id. However, the court
held that it "would need to know how those provisions oper-
ate in practice in order to address the petitioner's claims that
the EPA has acted in a way that is arbitrary or capricious or
violates the petitioner's due process rights." Id. Other courts
have also found provisions relating to intake pollutants are
unripe for review until they are implemented in a particular
factual setting. See Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 204-205 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that the
legal challenge is bound up in the more fact-dependent claims
'enough to tilt the balance in favor of finding not only the fact-
dependent claims, but also the more purely legal one, un-
ripe"') (citations omitted); Diamond Shamrock Corp. v.
Costle, 580 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1978) regarding whether
or not permittee may receive credits for pollutants present in
the intake water, the court stated the issue "may have links
to the concededly fact-dependent [issues] that we cannot now
fully perceive"). These courts applied the ripeness test de-
spite the statutory time limitation. See also Trustees for
Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 556 (9th Cir. 1984) (judicial re-
view of expired permits where "the fact that the original per-
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mit had expired was held to be irrelevant because of the
'highly reasonable expectation that petitioners will be sub-
jected to the same action again"') (citations omitted).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that a chal-
lenge to a water quality standard anti-degradation regulation
was unripe. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Train, 649
F.2d 481, 482 (7th Cir. 1980). Anti-degradation regulations
prevent states from adopting water quality standards which
are less stringent than water quality standards that pres-
ently exist, protecting water quality from being degraded.
See 40 C.F.R. § 130.17(e) (1980). In Edison, the court recog-
nized that an anti-degradation regulation, which requires
minimum water quality criteria be included in a state pro-
gram did not impose any obligations on the utilities challeng-
ing the regulations. Edison, 649 F.2d at 484. "Rather, the
regulation is directed at states and requires the states to
adopt and implement a policy which may or may not result in
a coercive order against utilities in the future." Id. The court
held that it "is impossible to predict, however, if at all, these
minimum criteria will affect utilities .... It is impossible to
determine at this point with any degree of certainty whether
the utilities will be injured by future action by the states."
Id.; see also Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 566 F.2d 451 (4th
Cir. 1977) (concluding that review of regulation regarding
cooling water intake structures would be speculative and pre-
mature until in a permit).
The fact that other courts have postponed judicial review
of agency action under the CWA, despite the statutory time
period, supports this Court postponing review in the instant
case. The court in Edison postponed review because it was
impossible to predict "with any degree of certainty" how the
petitioners would be affected by the provision during the stat-
utory time period following promulgation of the regulation.
Edison, 649 F.2d at 484. Similarly, in American Iron, the
court needed "to know how the [provision operates] in prac-
tice." American Iron, 115 F.3d 979, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In
the instant case, the blanket provision that no state water
quality standards be violated has the same uncertainty as the
water quality standard anti-degradation provisions ad-
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/4
BENCH MEMORANDUM
dressed by the courts in Edison and American Iron and Steel
Institute. It is not clear how XXX would be affected until the
permit condition "operates in practice." The permit condition
prohibits discharges, which violates state water quality stan-
dards. However, state water quality standards have no
meaning in the abstract. They consist of particular uses and
criteria to support those uses. They are normally imple-
mented by allocating the burden of achieving the criteria
among discharges contributing to the failure of achievement
and placing the allocations as effluent limitations in permits.
The permit at issue is a case in point. It could not have been
anticipated during the 120-day period after permit issuance
that the requirement to meet water quality standards would
be asserted to mean not violating a standard promulgated
under another statute and intended for another purpose, the
regulation of drinking water utilities by establishing stan-
dards to be applied at the tap, not in the river.
2. Other Statutes And Precedent
Congress has specifically established statutes of limita-
tions for judicial review of agency actions in other statutes.
See Orders of Federal Agencies; Review, 28 U.S.C. § 2344
(1994); CAA §307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1994); Oil Pollution
Act (OPA) § 1017(a), 33 U.S.C. § 2717(a) (1994). Neverthe-
less, courts have proceeded with a ripeness analysis to ad-
dress issues arising under these statutes.
The EPA promulgated "delegation" regulations, pursu-
ant to the CAA, which articulated procedures to be used in
determining whether or not to approve state rules or pro-
grams. See Louisiana Evtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87
F.3d 1379, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In Louisiana Environmen-
tal Action Network, petitioners challenged the delegation reg-
ulations. Id. According to the CAA, challenges to a
rulemaking must be made within 60 days of the rulemaking.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b). The petitioners brought the action
within the statutory time period. Louisiana Evtl. Action Net-
work, 87 F.3d at 1385. However, the court noted that other
courts have postponed review when there is a need to wait for
"a rule to be applied [to see] what its effect will be." Id. (citing
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Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Costle, 580 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C.
Cir. 1978)); Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 56-
59 (1993) (noting that mere promulgation of an agency regu-
lation does not make it ripe for challenge). The court stated
that because it could not "ascertain or predict the specific
practical problems that the trade associations, specifically,
the Clean Air Implementation Project, the Chemical Manu-
facturers Association, and the American Automobile Manu-
facturers Association, Inc. (collectively (CAIP)) and its
members might face or that might need remedy until the ap-
proval of some state's requirement or some other occurrence
cements the application and the effect of the challenged dele-
gation rules, [the court could not] review CAIP's claim now."
Louisiana Evtl. Action Network, 87 F.3d at 1384. "If federal
enforcement of state-adopted regulations provide the grounds
necessary for proper judicial review in this type of case, then
those grounds cannot have arisen until at least some prob-
lematic state regulation has received Environmental Protec-
tion Agency approval necessary for such federal
enforcement." Id.
In Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d
1200 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the petitioner challenged an EPA rule
permitting use of credible evidence to prove or disprove viola-
tions of the CAA. Clean Air Implementation Project, 150 F.3d
at 1201. The court noted the time limitation in the CAA and
stated that the provision does not require "the court to adju-
dicate issues raised in a pre-enforcement challenge to a rule
unless those issues are suitable for decision. If the issues are
not of that nature, we will dismiss the petition as unripe." Id.
at 1204 (citing Louisiana Envtl. Action Network, 87 F.3d at
1385); see also Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 146
F.3d 942, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1998). A challenge may be raised
when the issue becomes ripe, for example, in an enforcement
action. Clean Air Implementation Project, 150 F.3d at 1204.
Despite the statutory time period, the petitioner may raise
those issues when they become ripe. Id. (citing Louisiana
Envtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d at 1381); Balti-
more Gas & Elec. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 672
F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court recognized that it is
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sometimes necessary to see how a rule applies in a particular
situation. See Clean Air Implementation Project, 150 F.3d at
1206. The court proceeded to note that judicial review would
benefit from a more concrete and factual context. See id. at
1205, (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871
(1990)). The court did not find that the petitioners would be
unprotected. "If the credible evidence rule has in fact altered
these standards, petitioners can raise that as a defense in an
enforcement action." Id. In the instant case, the challenged
permit condition requires a more concrete factual context. As
in Clean Air Implementation Project, 150 F.3d 1200 (D.C. Cir.
1998), XXX should be able to raise the challenge as a defense
in an enforcement proceeding. Id. at 1205; See also Ass'n of
Am. R.Rs. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 146 F.3d 942, 946 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (concluding that despite 60-day statutory review
period for orders of the Surface Transportation Board under
28 U.S.C. § 2344, challenge to reasonableness of railroad
rates was not ripe because "judicial resolution of all of peti-
tioner's challenges would benefit from a concrete case"); Bal-
timore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 672
F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding that despite 60-day statu-
tory review period of federal agency orders under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2344 the challenge was not ripe for review, stating a "time
limitation on petitions for judicial review, it should be appar-
ent, can run only against challenges ripe for review" ); Gen-
eral Elec. Co. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d
767, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that despite a 90-day statu-
tory time period under the Oil Pollution Act, §§ 1001-7001,
(33 U.S.C. §§ 2701- 2761, the industry petitioners challenge
to NOAA regulations established pursuant to the Oil Pollu-
tion Act was unripe because the court lacked "both the fac-
tual record and the detailed findings").
XXX should not be required to challenge the issuance of a
permit in order to preserve the issue, if the challenge is
clearly unripe. Requiring every petitioner to file their chal-
lenge during the statutory period, even though the issue was
unripe, would violate the policy of conserving judicial re-
sources. Moreover, the bar on obtaining judicial review of
permit provisions during an enforcement action in CWA Sec-
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tion 509(b)(2) only applies to actions for which review "could
have been obtained" during the statutory time period. Since
courts cannot review issues which are unripe, review could
not have been obtained during the statutory time period.
III. WHETHER THE QUESTION OF
ENFORCEABILITY OF WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS WITHOUT CRITERIA IS A
MATTER OF STATE OR FEDERAL LAW.
State water quality standards consist of a state desig-
nated use for a particular waterbody and state developed cri-
teria to assure that use. See CWA § 303(c), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c) (1994). When a state adopts or revises a standard,
it must be submitted to the Administrator for approval. See
id. If the Administrator finds the standard is not consistent
with the CWA, the Administrator notifies the state, which
must then change the standard. See id. If the state fails to
change the standard, the Administrator will promulgate the
standard. See id.
When EPA administers the permit program, a permit ap-
plicant must first obtain certification from the state that the
permit will not violate CWA Sections 301, 302, 303, 306, and
307 of the CWAs or appropriate requirements of state law.
See CWA § 401(a), (d), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a), (d) (1994) CWA
Section 303 relates to state water quality standards. No per-
mit can be granted if certification is denied. See CWA
§§ 401(a), (d), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a), (d) (1994). A state may
withhold certification unless conditions are met. See CWA
§ 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341. Any certification condition to assure
compliance with CWA or state law requirements must be-
come a condition in a federal permit. See CWA § 401(d), 33
U.S.C. § 1341(d). In addition, CWA Section 301(b)(1)(C) also
requires permits to meet water quality standards as well as
other provisions of state law, independently of the conditions
imposed in a certification. CWA § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(b)(1)(C) (1994).
Therefore, state laws are incorporated into federal per-
mits as a matter of federal law. Federal NPDES permits are
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enforceable in citizen suits in the district courts. See CWA
§ 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). The question becomes
whether to apply state or federal law when interpreting con-
ditions implementing state water quality standards in fed-
eral permits. If the enforceability of water quality standards
is interpreted by state law, then, in the instant case, the des-
ignated use alone would not be enforceable. The Supreme
Court of New Union in Prentice v. Department of Envtl. Qual-
ity, 435 N.U. 875 (1989) (hypothetical case used for the Moot
Court Competition), held that "designated uses are merely
goals, to be implemented and given meaning by subsequent
administrative actions. As goals, the uses themselves are
not enforceable." However, if the enforceability of water
quality standards is interpreted by federal law, the opinion of
the Supreme Court of New Union regarding the water quality
standards is essentially irrelevant.
XXX and New Union argue that the issue of whether
water quality standards without criteria are enforceable is a
question of state law. As such, the holding of the Supreme
Court of New Union, that water quality standards are not en-
forceable without criteria, is controlling. See Prentice, 435
N.U. 875 (1989) (hypothetical case). XXX and New Union
claim that the issue is a question of state law because it inter-
prets state regulations based on a state statute. The provi-
sion was incorporated into the permit as a condition of state
certification. Therefore, the EPA and the citizens are bound
by the state court's interpretation.
FOR, on the other hand, claims that the issue is a ques-
tion of federal law. FOR claims that the state water quality
regulations must be approved by the EPA as consistent with
the CWA and, according to the United States Supreme Court,
are thereby "federalized." See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503
U.S. 91 (1992). In the instant case, the permit provision is
boilerplate in EPA permits, without regard to certification.
The EPA would have, and was required, to include the provi-
sion in the permit regardless of the state certification condi-
tion. Even if the court determines that the provision was
incorporated as a condition of state certification rather than
EPA initiative, the regulations are incorporated into federal
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permits and enforceable through the CWA, a federal statute.
Therefore, the court is not bound by the state court's
interpretation.
A. Enforceability Of State Water Quality Standards
Without Criteria Is A Matter Of Federal Law.
1. The Clean Water Act And Precedent
a) The Statute
CWA Section 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994), prohibits
discharges unless they comply with specified sections of the
CWA. CWA Section 302, 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994), relating to
federal water quality standards, is one of the sections,
although Section 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994), relating to
state water quality standards, is not one of those specified
sections. In addition, EPA must incorporate water quality
standards as permit conditions under CWA Section
301(b)(1)(C), as a matter of federal law. CWA § 301(b)(1)(C),
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1994). The provision at issue in
the instant case is boilerplate EPA language, incorporated
into every permit issued by the EPA region under federal
law. A permit cannot be issued unless the applicant receives
Section 401 certification. Such certification assures that the
permit will satisfy requirements specified in the CWA , as a
matter of federal law, including Section 303, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313. See CWA § 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1994).
The certification requirements must be incorporated into a
federal license or permit. See CWA § 401(d), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(d) (1994).
Even if the provision prohibiting violations of state water
quality standards had its origin in state law, the federal in-
terpretation must control. CWA Section 301(b)(1)(C) requires
the EPA to comply with water quality standards established
under both state and federal law. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
Similarly, the certification under Sections 401(a) and (d) re-
quires states to certify requirements necessary to meet water
quality standards under both federal and state law. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1341 (a), (d). The use designation in the instant
case falls under both state and federal law. The State of New
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Union has interpreted the use to be unenforceable without
accompanying criteria. However, the Supreme Court of the
United States has stated that water quality standards with-
out criteria are enforceable. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson
County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 717
(1994), affg 849 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1993) [hereinafter Jefferson
County III. The CWA preserves state law only if it is more
stringent than the federal law. CWA § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370
(1994). In this case, the state interpretation is less stringent
and the federal interpretation must prevail.
b) Precedent
In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992), the
Supreme Court addressed whether or not the interpretation
of an Oklahoma water quality standard was a matter of state
or federal law. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, at 92. The state regu-
lation provided that "'no degradation [of water quality] shall
be allowed' in the upper Illinois River." Id. at 95 (citations
omitted). The Supreme Court held that the relevant federal
agency's interpretation of a state water quality standard
should be given deference. See id. at 110. The EPA requires
permits to comply with the applicable water quality require-
ments of any affected states. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (1998);
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 109. The Supreme Court
recognized that this regulation "incorporates into federal law
those state-law standards the Agency reasonably determines
to be 'applicable.'" Id. at 109. Such water quality standards
are "part of the federal law of water pollution." Id.
The holding in Washington Department of Ecology v.
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County [hereinafter Jefferson County
1], 849 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1993), affd, 511 U.S. 700 (1994) is
contrary to the holding in Arkansas. In Jefferson County I,
the Supreme Court of Washington addressed whether the
Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 792-828(u) (1993),
pre-empts state water quality standards. The State of Wash-
ington granted a CWA Section 401 certification to an appli-
cant for a license under the Federal Power Act to build a dam,
but conditioned certification upon maintenance of a specified
minimum streamflow. Jefferson County 1, 849 P.2d at 648.
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The state condition regulating streamflow was challenged as
being pre-empted by the Federal Power Act which requires
applicants to first secure permits from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission. See id. at 655. The court recognized
that water quality standards have a hybrid character, being
required by federal law, yet issued and interpreted by state
law. See id. at 654. Hence, review of the certification is left
to the state court. See id. at 653. The decision could be inter-
preted as recognizing water quality standards as state law to
be interpreted by a state court. However, the decision in Jef-
ferson County I is inapplicable because the court interpreted
a state law requirement as applied to a license issued under
the Federal Power Act, the purpose of which is to promote
hydrologic power, not to protect water quality. The purpose
of the certification requirement in that case is to assure that
federal and state water quality concerns are not ignored in
the effort to develop power sources. Interpreting state water
quality standards as a matter of state law in that context of-
fends the Federal Power Act no differently than requiring
power projects to meet environmental standards. On the
other hand, the very purpose of the CWA and of CWA permits
is to achieve water quality standards and the CWA itself, as a
matter of federal law, establishes the means of doing so. To
interpret water quality standards as matters of state rather
than federal law in that context ignores the Supremacy
Clause.
2. The Clean Air Act SIPs And Precedent
State water quality standards are analogous in some
ways to the Clean Air Act State Implementation Plans (SIPs).
See CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (1994). Under the
CWA, a waterbody is designated for a particular use, criteria
are developed to achieve that use, and limitations are devel-
oped in permits for individual pollution sources to meet the
criteria. See CWA § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994). These
water quality standards are enforceable when incorporated
into NPDES permits. See CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(1994). Similarly, under the Clean Air Act, the statute itself
establishes the use for air, National Ambient Air Quality
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Standards (NAAQS) are developed for pollutants as criteria
to achieve the use, and state implementation plans are devel-
oped to secure pollution reduction from individual sources to
meet the criteria. CAA § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994). The
courts have generally held that once a SIP is approved by the
EPA, its requirements are "binding as a matter of federal
law." Oregon Envtl. Council v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. Qual-
ity, No.CIV.91-13-FR, 1992 WL 252123 *1 (D. Or. Sept. 24,
1992); see also Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v. EPA, 858 F.2d
282 (6th Cir. 1988); EPA v. AM Gen. Corp., 808 F. Supp. 1353
(N.D. Ind. 1992); United States. v. General Motors Corp., No.
87-2068-ML, 1988 WL 82247 (D. Mass. May 16, 1988), rev'd
on other grounds, 876 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that
once approved, SIP is enforceable under both State and fed-
eral law); Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., 32 F.3d 491 (10th
Cir. 1994) (stating that SIP has force and effect of federal
law); United States v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 908 F. Supp. 835
(D. Colo. 1995); Olson v. Arizona, 803 P.2d 448 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1990). The SIP requirements must be approved by the EPA
as being consistent with the Clean Air Act, even though SIP
requirements stand as state regulations promulgated by
state agencies, under the authority of state statutes. There-
fore, the EPA must necessarily interpret each requirement
and it is the federal interpretation of the requirement that is
determined to be consistent with the Clean Air Act. Simi-
larly, state water quality standards must be approved by the
EPA as being consistent with the CWA. It is the federal in-
terpretation of each state water quality standard that is con-
sidered when determining whether the water quality
standard is consistent with the CWA.
In American Lung Association of N.J. v. Kean, 670 F.
Supp. 1285 (D.N.J. 1987), the court refused to give deference
to a state's interpretation of its own SIP requirements. Id. at
1291. Plaintiffs, non-profit associations, claimed that the SIP
required the state to perform "specific rulemaking and imple-
mentation steps" which the state had not done. Am. Lung,
679 F. Supp. at 1290. The state interpreted the SIP only to
require a study of the feasibility of particular strategies and
to implement only those strategies which were determined to
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be feasible. See id. The court refused to give deference to the
state's interpretation, holding that, at least when the Clean
Air Act requires the state to design the regulations that bind
it, the state should not be afforded the "opportunity to define
away attempts at regulatory enforcement." Id. at 1291.
B. Enforceability Of Water Quality Standards Without
Criteria Is A Question Of State Law.
1. The Clean Water Act
The CWA contains two sections that indicate state water
quality standards are state law and should be given state
rather than federal interpretation. First, Section 301(b)(1)(C)
requires the achievement of:
any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to
meet water quality standards, treatment standards, or
schedules of compliance, established pursuant to any State
law or regulations (under authority preserved by section
1370), or any other Federal law or regulations, or required
to implement any applicable water quality standard estab-
lished under this chapter.
CWA § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1994) (empha-
sis added). The fact that the provision mentions both "state
law" and "water quality standards" might suggest that
"water quality standards" are not "state law." Id. However,
since the use of "water quality standards" twice cannot be re-
dundant, the phrases "water quality standards . ..estab-
lished pursuant to state law" and "water quality standard[s]
established pursuant to this chapter" must distinguish the
origins of the water quality standards. Id. A state water
quality standard is established by the state and a "water
quality standard established pursuant to this chapter" is a
standard established by the Administrator under CWA Sec-
tion 302, 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994). Therefore, the Administra-
tor is required to include in the permit more stringent
limitations based on state water quality standards.
Second, the EPA cannot issue a permit without state cer-
tification. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(b) (1998). The EPA is re-
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quired to incorporate certification requirements into a permit
unless doing so would be inconsistent with the CWA. See
CWA § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). In that respect, such
state requirements are not reviewable by the EPA and are
automatically included in the permit. Petitioners must chal-
lenge the actions of the certifying state agency in state court,
not the federal permitting agency in federal court. The EPA's
only participation in including a water quality standard in a
permit is to determine whether or not the standard is consis-
tent with the CWA. Therefore, substantive and procedural
state law should be used to interpret the water quality stan-
dard. Any review or appeals of "limitations and conditions
attributable to state certification shall be made through the
applicable procedures of the state and may not be made
through the procedures in [40 C.F.R. Part 124]." 40 C.F.R.
124.55(d) (1998). The conditions of certification must then be
incorporated into permits. See CWA § 401(d), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(d).
2. Precedent
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the ques-
tion of whether water quality standards are state or federal
law, in American Rivers, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 129 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997). The federal permit-
issuing agency, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), refused to incorporate the certification requirements
in the federal permit that it issued to the applicant. See Am.
Rivers, 129 F.3d at 103. FERC claimed that, as a matter of
federal law, the specific requirements were beyond the scope
of the state's authority under the CWA. See id. The court of
appeals held that FERC had no choice but to include the con-
dition certified by the state. See id. at 107. The state
agency's action in issuing the certification was being ap-
pealed and only a state court could hear the appeal.
In Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission
v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982), petitioners challenged
the refusal of the Administrator of the EPA to issue an
NPDES permit to a particular company. Roosevelt Campo-
bello, 684 F.2d at 1044. The state provided certification re-
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quiring various state law provisions be included in the
permit. See id. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ordered
the EPA to issue the permit without the conditions. See id.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
"EPA has interpreted [CWA § 401(d)] to preclude federal
agency review of state certification" and that "review and ap-
peals of limitations and conditions attributable to state certi-
fication shall be made through the applicable procedures of
the state and may not be made through procedures estab-
lished in federal regulations." Id. at 1056; 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.55(e) (1998). The court recognized that courts have
consistently upheld the interpretation, holding that chal-
lenges to a state's certification should be brought in the state
court. Id. at 1056. The federal courts and agencies do not
have authority to "review the validity of requirements im-
posed under state law or in a state's certification." Id.; see
also Keating v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 927 F.2d 616
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding validity of a state-certification
was a matter of state law).
In United States v. Marathon Development Corp., 867
F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1989), defendants allegedly bulldozed wet-
lands protected by Section 404 of the CWA. Marathon Dev.,
867 F.2d at 97. Defendants argued that a National Permit
under 30 C.F.R. § 330.5(a)(26)(1986) applied and, therefore,
they did not need to obtain an individual permit. See Mara-
thon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d at 99. The court rejected this argu-
ment. The National Permit was not applicable because
Massachusetts had denied CWA Section 401 certification, re-
quired for both individual and general permits. See id. The
court held that the proper forum for review of state certifica-
tion is "state court, rather than federal court, because a state
law determination is involved." Id. at 102.
The decision in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91
(1992), holding that state regulations were federal law, is dis-
tinguishable. The court's holding was limited to state water
quality standards that affect another state. Id. at 110. The
court stated "we recognize that, at least insofar as they affect
the issuance of a permit in another State, the Oklahoma stan-
dards have a federal character." Id. (emphasis added).
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Therefore, the opinion does not resolve whether or not water
quality standards that do not affect another state are federal
or state law.
Furthermore, analogies to the Clean Air Act are mis-
placed. The CWA designates a goal of fishable, swimmable
waters, but the states designate the uses for their waterbo-
dies. Under the CAA, on the other hand, Congress has estab-
lished the designated use is public health. CAA § 109(b), 42
U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1994). Moreover, under the CAA, the fed-
eral government designates the criteria to meet the use, the
NAAQS, whereas the states designate the criteria under the
CWA. See CAA § 109(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1994); CWA
§ 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994). The different roles the federal
and state governments play under the Clean Air Act and the
CWA prevent any analogies from being drawn between the
two regarding the federal or state character of standards.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT A PERMIT CONDITION
GENERALLY REQUIREING COMPLIANCE
WITH STATE WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS IS ENFORCEABLE
WITHOUT BEING TRANSLATED INTO A
SPECIFIC LIMITATION.
Before 1972, most states had water quality standards.
See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water
Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 1167, 1178 (1983). States were required to develop
water quality standards for approval by the Department of
the Interior. See id. The standards themselves were essen-
tially the basis of the federal government determining
whether a violation had occurred. See id. The government
had to identify the source of pollution and prove whether or
not the source had caused the violation of the water quality
standard. Id. at 1179. Difficulties in proving which among
many pollution sources on a waterbody caused a violation of
its water quality standards proved the earlier legislation in-
adequate to control pollution. Id.
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The water pollution control approach clearly had to be
changed. The Senate wanted to abolish state water quality
standards altogether and replace them with federal stan-
dards based on technology. See Gaba, supra, at 1183. The
House of Representatives wanted to keep water quality stan-
dards and control with the states. See id. The final CWA ac-
complished both. See id. at 1185. The new CWA provided
dischargers and enforcement agencies with federal technol-
ogy based standards, more guidance on water quality stan-
dards, a permitting program run by EPA or the states, an
effective federal enforcement provision, and deadlines for
achieving standards. Id. The intention was to use technology
based standards in the first instance and make permit limita-
tions more stringent if necessary to achieve water quality
standards. See id.
States are required to designate a use for each waterbody
and develop criteria on how clean the water must be to sup-
ports that use. See CWA § 303(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (1994).
The state must determine the TMDL of a pollutant that the
receiving waterbody can tolerate to achieve criteria. See
CWA § 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (1994). Once
the TMDL is determined, pollution reduction is allocated
among sources, by translating the necessary reduction into
numeric pollution discharge limitations in individual permits
for specific point sources. See Gaba, supra, at 1175. Water
quality standards are enforceable once they are adopted in
permits as effluent limitations based on the water quality
standards and allocated among sources. See id. In the in-
stant case, the state has adopted no criteria for selenium.
Nor has it determined a TMDL for selenium in the river, in-
deed without a criterion, it could not. Nor has it developed a
wasteload allocation between XXX and Sigma Chemical, the
larger source of selenium identified on the river.
The House Report evidences the intention of Congress to
establish technology based standards as the primary means
of regulation, while retaining water quality standards as a
backup strategy where more stringent control is necessary.
The House report stated that the federal water quality stan-
dards section "provides authority to supplement any effluent
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limitation ... in the event such [technical standards] are in-
adequate to protect public water supplies ... [The State
water quality standards section] continues the use of water
quality standards." H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 104 (1972). The
Report added that:
even though all point sources must .. .as a minimum,
meet the requirements of subsection (b)(1)(A) and subsec-
tion (b)(1)(B) of section 301 [regarding technology based ef-
fluent limitations] all point sources could be required to
meet a more stringent effluent limitation consistent with
water quality standards of the receiving waters if the efflu-
ent limitations set pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(A) and
subsection (b)(1)(B) of section 301 are inadequate to meet
those water quality standards.
Id. at 105.
The earlier 1965 CWA had established water quality
standards as the control mechanism. See S. Rep. No. 92-414
at 8 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N 3668, 3675. The
states were supposed to designate water uses and types and
amounts of pollutants to be tolerated. See id. The Senate Re-
port noted that the water quality standards program was not
successful. See id. The problem with water quality stan-
dards is that they "often cannot be translated into effluent
limitations - defendable in court tests, because of the impre-
cision of models for water quality and the effects of effluents
in most waters." Id. Water quality standards failed because
they were not specific enough for people to know how to act.
Id. The Senate resolved to abandon the water quality stan-
dards and establish discharge requirements based on what
technology could achieve. See id. "The Committee adopted
this substantial change because of the great difficulty associ-
ated with establishing reliable and enforceable precise efflu-
ent limitations on the basis of a given stream quality." Id.
Permits containing technology-based standards reduced re-
quirements to meaningful and understandable limitations.
XXX and New Union maintain that the legislative his-
tory demonstrates that the CWA was intended to provide cer-
tainty to permittees. Indeed, Congress stated that it was
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"attempting to... provide law that can be administered with
certainty and precision." 117 Cong. Rec. 17,404 (1971). An
unqualified permit condition that XXX simply meet water
quality standards is inconsistent with this congressional in-
tent. In order to achieve certainty, a five step process is fol-
lowed: the state designates a use; criteria is established to
support that use; a TMDL is determined; the waste load for
the pollutant is allocated among the polluting sources; and
effluent limitations are included in permits based on the
waste load allocations. See Gaba, supra, at 1168. XXX and
New Union argue that only the first step was completed.
Without criteria and a TMDL for selenium, a waste load allo-
cation can not be made between XXX and Sigma Chemical,
the other discharger of selenium, one mile upstream. If a
waste load allocation is not reduced to an effluent limitation
in a permit, XXX does not know how much selenium must be
reduced from in its discharge and how much will be reduced
from Sigma Chemical. Therefore, to enforce the water qual-
ity standards, it is necessary to reduce them to numeric or
specific effluent limitations in the permit.
FOR claims that it is not necessary to follow the five step
process to implement water quality standards. Although the
five step process may be preferable, including in the permit a
condition prohibiting violations of the state water quality
standards is also a valid method. In fact, narrative standards
are routinely enforced without allocation or reduction to spe-
cific numbers. FOR relies on precedent to support its claim
that water quality use designations are enforceable without
applying the five step process reducing criteria to effluent
limitations. See Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Port-
land, 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995); Jefferson County H, 511
U.S. 700 (1994), affg 849 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1993). Moreover, if
the court does require criteria for selenium, the use essen-




A. A General Condition Requiring Compliance With Water
Quality Standards Is Enforceable.
1. The Clean Water Act
As previously mentioned, CWA Section 505, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (1994), allows citizens to bring an action to enforce vi-
olations of an "effluent standard or limitation." Id. This sec-
tion defines "effluent standard or limitation" as, inter alia, a
limitation under Section 301, certification under section 401,
or a section 402 permit "condition." See CWA § 505(f)(5), 33
U.S.C. § 1365(f)(5). As we saw above, Section 301(b)(1)(C) in-
cludes state water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994).
Certification, itself, is composed of conditions based, in part,
on state water quality standards. A condition in XXX's per-
mit requires compliance with state water quality standards.
Therefore, the general permit requirement for compliance
with state water quality standards is enforceable.
2. Precedent
The Supreme Court, in Jefferson County 11, 511 U.S. 700
(1994), affd, 511 U.S. 700 (1994), analyzed the enforceability
of a water quality standard use designation, in the absence of
the usual translation of the use to a criterion, to a waste load
allocation, and ultimate numerical quantification. In recog-
nizing that the CWA sets forth two components for water
quality standards, the use and criteria, the Court stated that
"the language of Section 303 [regarding state water quality
standards] is most naturally to be read to require that a pro-
ject be consistent with both components." Id. at 714. The
Court added that "under the literal terms of the statute, a
project that does not comply with a designated use of the
water does not comply with the applicable standard." Id.
The Supreme Court also noted that the EPA does not require
uses to be protected solely through numerical criteria. See id.
Rather, the regulations provide that "when criteria are met,
water quality will generally protect the designated use." Id.;
40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b) (1998). The Court interpreted the EPA
regulations to establish that criteria alone will sometimes be
insufficient to protect a use. See Jefferson County II, at 714.
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The Court determined "the petitioner's attempt to distinguish
between uses and criteria loses much of its force in light of
the fact that the CWA permits enforcement of broad, narra-
tive criteria based on, for example, 'aesthetics."' Id. at 716. If
the Court were to find otherwise, then, if a particular crite-
rion were missing or insufficient, the state would have to al-
low certain activity, even if it was inconsistent with the use.
See id. at 717. Criteria are intended to fulfill sufficient water
quality protection requirements. However, they "cannot rea-
sonably be expected to anticipate all the water quality issues
arising from every activity" that affect a state's waterbodies.
Id. States should not be limited to enforcing only the criteria
component. See id.
In Northwest Environmental Advocates v. City of Port-
land, 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995), an environmental group
sued for violation of a water quality standard use from com-
bined sewer overflows. Id. at 980. The permit prohibited dis-
charges that would violate Oregon water quality standards
adopted in Or. Admin. R. 340-41-445. Northwest Envtl. Advo-
cates, 56 F.3d at 986. The environmental group alleged that
the sewage discharges made the waterbody unsuitable for its
designated use. See id. The defendant said the use was not
enforceable in a citizen suit because Section 505 only allows
citizens to enforce water quality standards which are trans-
lated into effluent limitations. Id. at 980. The court held the
provision was enforceable because Congress did not intend to
replace water quality standards with quantitative effluent
limitations in permits. See id. at 986. Rather, such effluent
limitations were intended to improve enforcement of
whatever standards they are derived from, whether water
quality standards or technology-based standards. See id.
In Gill v. Schuette, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (W.D. Wash.
1998), the court enforced a water quality standard designated
use despite the fact that water quality criteria had not been
violated. The defendants operated a quarry that discharged
silt into pond. See id. at 1191. The permit prohibited dis-
charges that violated Washington State Water Quality Stan-
dards, which included various uses and a turbidity limitation.
See id. at 1193. The plaintiffs claimed that silt, carried by a
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stream to their pond, made the pond unsuitable for recreation
or domestic uses. See id. at 1194. Plaintiffs alleged the dis-
charge violated state turbidity limitations. See id. at 1193.
The court did not find the turbidity limitations had been vio-
lated, but did find the pond was not suitable for the desig-
nated uses for water supply, recreation, and raising fish. See
id. The court held "[iun that regard, at least, defendants have
violated the state standards condition in their permits." See
id.
In the instant case, the standard consists of drinking
water use. Any discharge that causes the water body to be
unsuitable for this designated use must be prohibited. The
use is enforceable just as broad narrative criteria are enforce-
able. There is no difference between narrative criteria that
state "no discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts" and a
use that requires "the waterbody must remain of drinkable
quality." Id. The water is not drinkable if it is harmful to
human health. Because the defendant's discharge causes it
to exceed the MCL for selenium (established by EPA in a
rulemaking under the SDWA), 40 C.F.R. § 141.51 (1998), de-
fendant's discharge therefore causes it to be harmful to
humans and violates this use requirement.
Even if a numerical criteria were required, the water
quality standard in the instant case would not fail. Although
the permit does not contain an express numerical criteria, the
use is accompanied by an ascertainable criteria. The SDWA,
§ 1412, 42 U.S.C § 300g-1 (Supp. II 1996), requires the Ad-
ministrator to publish regulations regarding the maximum
contaminant level for certain contaminants in drinking water
to protect human health. The EPA has published, pursuant
to the SDWA, 42 U.S.C § 300g-1, a MCL for selenium. See 40
C.F.R. § 141.51 (1998). Therefore, discharges that cause a
level of concentration of selenium exceeding this level would
cause the water body to be inappropriate for its designated
use, and therefore would violate the water quality standard.
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B. A General Condition Requiring Compliance With Water
Quality Standards Is Not Enforceable.
1. The Clean Water Act
The CWA expressly states that water quality standards
consist of both a use and criteria necessary to protect that
use. CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994). Therefore, a water
quality standard can not exist without both components. The
use is assured by meeting criteria necessary to protect that
use.
Criteria are only the beginning of the enforcement pro-
cess of water quality standards. Criteria are translated into
specific limitations in a permit. This is particularly impor-
tant if more than one discharger is contributing to the ex-
ceedance of a criterion for a particular pollutant. There are
two reasons for reducing criteria to specific limitations in per-
mits. First, Congress required that the CWA's environmental
"controls must relate the economic and social benefits to be
gained with the economic and social costs to be incurred."
117 Cong. Rec. 17,404 (1971). Thus, the CWA emphasizes
economic efficiency. Pollution sources are only required to
spend that which is necessary to meet water quality stan-
dards. Pollution only needs to be reduced enough to meet
water quality standards. In order to achieve this, a
waterbody must have: 1) a designated use as well as criteria
which determines how clean the water must be in order to
meet the use; 2) a TMDL to determine the amount of a pollu-
tant the waterbody can tolerate and still meet the criteria; 3)
a waste load allocation to determine how much of a pollutant
each source of must reduce in its discharge; and 4) the trans-
lation of the allocation into a permit effluent limitation. In
the instant case, only the designated use, drinking water, ex-
ists. There is no criteria, TMDL, or waste load allocation for
selenium. This is particularly important because XXX is not
the only discharger of selenium into the Roaritan River. In
fact, another discharger one mile upstream, Sigma Chemical,
discharges twice as much selenium as XXX. Although there
is no specific criteria, FOR claims when the MCL for sele-
nium is exceeded; the use is violated. The concentration of
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selenium does not violate the MCL until XXX's discharge is
added to the selenium already discharged by Sigma Chemi-
cal. To require XXX to meet the nonexistent criteria for sele-
nium is to place on it the entire responsibility for violating
the criteria and the entire economic burden of meeting crite-
ria, even though Sigma Chemical discharges twice as much
selenium. This has been done with no rational explanation.
This result is contrary to the letter and spirit of the water
quality standards allocation process, which is designed to
achieve water quality standards by sharing the burden of pol-
lution reduction among those responsible for it on some ra-
tional basis.
The second purpose behind the permit program is to
specify what is expected of the permit holder. See 117 Cong.
Rec. 17,404 (1971). Congress attempted to provide for admin-
istration of the CWA with "certainty and precision." Id.
There is an administrative process to develop permit limits.
See S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 80 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746. A subsequent enforcement action
merely reviews compliance with such permit limits. Id.
"Therefore, an objective evidentiary standard will have to be
met by any citizen who brings an action .... " S. Rep. No. 92-
414 at 79 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745.
In order to satisfy this goal of specificity, each pollutant to be
regulated must be identified and quantitatively limited. In
order for a source to determine the proper equipment and
technology necessary to reduce a pollutant, the permit holder
must know exactly how much of a pollutant it may discharge.
2. Precedent
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlantic States
Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353
(2nd Cir. 1994), held that the discharge of a pollutant which
is not listed in the permit for that point source, does not vio-
late the CWA. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, 12 F.3d at
357. The court noted that the "permit is intended to identify
and limit the most harmful pollutants while leaving the con-
trol of the vast number of other pollutants to disclosure re-
quirements." Id. Pollutants may be discharged even if they
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are not specifically listed in a permit as long as reporting re-
quirements are complied with. See id. The CWA itself pro-
vides a "shield provision" which states that "compliance with
a[n] [NPDES] permit shall be deemed compliance ... with
[the Act]." CWA § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1994). The
Court quoted an EPA interpretation in which it recognized
that:
it is impossible to identify and rationally limit every chemi-
cal or compound in a discharge of pollutants .. .Compli-
ance with such a permit would be impossible and anybody
seeking to harass a permittee need only analyze that per-
mittee's discharge until determining the presence of a sub-
stance not identified in the permit.
Atlantic States Legal Foundation, 12 F.3d at 357 (citations
omitted). If a polluter discharged a pollutant that was not
listed in a permit but was detrimental to the receiving
waterbody, the EPA could modify the permit to limit the pol-
lutant. Id. at 358. Therefore, the purpose of the NPDES per-
mit is to identify and limit those pollutants that are "most
harmful." Id. at 357. The permit condition in the instant
case, the designated use, does not prohibit any specific chemi-
cal or compound. Essentially any chemical or compound in
concentrations high enough to deter people from drinking the
water would be banned, despite the fact that the chemical or
compound is not listed in the permit. This is inconsistent
with the shield provision of the CWA, the interpretation of
the EPA, and the opinion of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.
In Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 16
F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993), the court analyzed water quality
standards. The court noted that the EPA's "duty, under the
CWA and the accompanying regulations, is to ensure that the
underlying criteria, which are used as the basis of a particu-
lar state's water quality standard, are scientifically defensi-
ble and are protective of designated uses." Id. at 1402.
Therefore, while the nature of the designated use determines
what criteria are needed to protect the use, the criteria are
the basis for protection and enforcement of the use.
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In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States
Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987), the court stated
that "it is not the water quality standards themselves which
are enforceable in Section 1311(b)(1)(C), but it is the limita-
tions necessary to meet those standards, or required to imple-
ment those standards." Natural Resources Council, 834 F.2d
at 850. Only permit limitations derived from water quality
standards, not water quality standards themselves, are en-
forceable by citizen suits. There needs to be limitations to
enforce the standards that a state sets. Water quality stan-
dards are not enforceable in citizen suits. As previously men-
tioned, once water quality standards are set, pollution
reduction is allocated among sources. See Gaba, supra, at
1175. The allocation is generally translated into numeric dis-
charge limitations in individual permits. See id. Only those
limitations necessary to meet the standards are enforceable.
The water quality standard in the instant case, the desig-
nated use, must be reduced to a discharge limitation for sele-
nium in the permit for the point source. Only then can a
violation for the discharge of selenium occur.
Furthermore, Jefferson County 11, 511 U.S. 700 (1994),
affg 849 P. 2d 646 (Wash. 1993), is inapplicable. There the
state established the use designation of the fish propagation
for the river. The state then in its certification established a
minimum "flow" condition, essentially a numerical criterion
for assuring the use of fish propagation to be placed in the
applicant's permit. See id. In the present case, the state has
not designated selenium as a criterion or adopted the MCL as
a quantification for that criterion. See id. Instead, FOR, a
non-governmental body, has done so or seeks a federal court
to do so instead of the state administrative agency to whom
the CWA has entrusted that task.
Moreover, in Jefferson County II, the Court did not inter-
pret the terms of a CWA permit. Rather, it determined the
state's power to condition certification of power production
permits under another statute, the Federal Power Act. There
is a vast difference between the two. Section 401 was enacted
prior to 1972, when federal water pollution legislation did not
have a permit or license requirement. The section's clear
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purpose was to assure that federal permit and licenses, is-
sued under other, non-water pollution control statutes, for
projects potentially detrimental to the environment were con-
ditioned to prevent damage to water quality. CWA
§ 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1994) The whole purpose
of CWA permits, of course, is to improve water quality. There
is no process in the CWA to reduce water quality standards to
numerical effluent limitations for uses other than CWA per-
mits. There is such a process for reducing them to numerical
limitations for CWA permits. Since Congress has provided
that process for the very purpose at issue in this case, disre-
garding it would violate the statute.
Third, the Court's discussion of narrative criteria was
dicta and is irrelevant. It was dicta in that case because the
state imposed a numerical limitation on flow in its certifica-
tion. Jefferson County II is irrelevant here because the
state's certification condition was not a narrative criterion
(e.g. "no toxic pollutants in toxic substance in a toxic amount
or concentration") but merely a reiteration of the statutory
requirement that water quality standards not be violated.
The state here has not developed a narrative criterion or
placed a numerical limitation in its certification condition.
There may be situations in which criteria cannot be reduced
to numerical limits in permits. This is not such a case. FOR
advocates a numerical limit, but one it, not the state, seeks to
impose. Where numerical limits can be developed they must
be to meet the objective of providing the permittee in the spe-
cific and certain limits, rather than guessing what it is sup-
posed to do.
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